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Background 
The Natural Resources Institute has been conducting preliminary research on 
experiences with private sector provision of credit to small-holders for production 
inputs1• The initial research focused on the cotton sectors in Uganda and Zimbabwe, 
where input credit different systems are in operation. The intention is to distil key 
conditions from these experiences with a view to identifying potential applications in 
other sectors. 
The research has highlighted the extremely low input/low output nature of most 
farming systems in Uganda, and very low use of even the most fundamental 
components of improved technology ie., improved varieties (either open-pollinated or 
hybrid seed) and fertiliser. There are a number of factors influencing this which can 
be categorised under four broad headings: affordability, physical access, awareness 
and commercial context. Access to credit influences affordability and can certainly 
play a role, but it is clear that other factors are equally important. Box 1 lists some of 
the issues which impinge on the use of purchased inputs. 
Box 1: Issues affecting small-holder use of purchased inputs in Uganda 
AFFORD ABILITY 
• production economics 
• cost- and cost components ( eg transaction costs) 
• unit size 
• credit - and target beneficiaries ( eg farmers or traders) 
• role of subsidies 
PHYSICAL ACCESS 
• supply of seed (domestic or imported) 
• availability of appropriate technology (varietal testing and development) 
• timeliness 
• trader and retailer networks 
AWARENESS 
• extension (decentralised extension services, NGOs) 
• "demonstration effecf' (eg areas adjacent to Kenya or Uganda Seed Project farms) 
• commercial promotion 
• role ofmedia 
COMMERCIAL CONTEXT 
• the extent to which farmers operate in the commercial sector 
• farmer confidence in markets - and market instability 
• commercial activity undermined by handouts? 
1 This work is funded by the Crop Post-Harvest Research Programme of the UK Department for 
International Development 
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Purpose of workshop 
The workshop in Uganda provided a forum for discussion of these issues, and helped 
identify priorities for further work. The purpose of the workshop was fourfold: 
(a) to identify key issues affecting use of inputs by small-holders 
(b) to identify situations and circumstances, or interventions, which 
facilitate increased use of purchased inputs by small-holder farmers 
(and conversely to identify types of initiatives which do not work) 
(c) to identify possible new strategies to increase the use of inputs by 
farmers, including consideration of targeting (farmer type, crop or 
region), and public/private NGO/commercial roles, and 
(d) to inform the development of proposals for further work. 
Participants drew on practical and policy experience relating to the use of farm inputs 
in Uganda- providing commercial, NGO, government and donor perspectives. A full 
list of participants is attached at Annex 1. 
Overview of presentations 
The keynote address on the first evening was given by Dr Willie Odwongo, senior 
policy analyst at the Agricultural Policy Secretariat. He set agricultural intensification 
within the context of the Ugandan Government's policy for the "modernisation of 
agriculture". Modernisation carries many different meanings -but he stressed the 
need to commercialise agriculture, and the role of the agricultural sector as the 
"engine of growth". He described the on-going process of consultation and consensus 
building to elaborate this policy, and listed ten priority areas for the development of 
workable strategies. A number of these areas are relevant to farmer· use of purchased 
inputs (extension, rural finance, agricultural marketing and private sector 
development, for instance) - but the importance of a holistic approach to these issues 
was stressed. 
The following day, presentations by Ann Gordon and Andrew Goodland, provided 
background on the research and consultations carried out by NRI prior to the 
workshop. The experiences with small-holder input credit in Zimbabwe and Uganda 
provide some useful lessons, and highlight a range of mechanisms, suitable for 
different situations, to ensure repayment of input credit by small-holders. Low use of 
purchased inputs is a constraint on small-holder productivity in both countries- but 
small-holder farmers in Zimbabwe appear to make more use of purchased inputs than 
their counterparts in Uganda. Some are able to pay for these out of savings - and all 
benefit from more developed input distribution networks than currently exist in 
Uganda. 
Mark Wood, of the Agribusiness Development Centre (ADC), took up the theme of 
intensification, drawing on ADC's experiences with maize and beans. He stressed the 
importance of farmers adopting a business-minded approach to the management of 
their agricultural activities. Action in three areas would increase farmer incomes, he 
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contended: technology transfer, input supply and output marketing. ADC is working 
with local partners to encourage small-holder adoption of high yielding varieties, 
fertiliser and improvement crop management. It is piloting selective support to input 
distribution and retailer networks -to try to develop sustainable commercial systems. 
In the area of output marketing, ADC is testing a community-based system which 
focuses on improved quality and handling, as well as price information. In addition, 
higher yields will result in lower per unit production costs - making it easier for 
farmers to cope with price instability in output markets (notably low prices). 
Fred Muhhuku's presentation dealt with the production and marketing of agricultural 
seeds in Uganda. He drew on his experience as marketing manager of the Uganda 
Seed Project, to explore the issues surrounding the Ugandan farmer's preference for 
retained seed and traditional varieties. He stressed the need for: increased farmer 
awareness; better varieties; supply of other inputs; policy and institutional change to 
support private production and marketing where appropriate, and informal non-market 
methods in other areas; and improved seed certification and control. 
John Magnay, managing director ofMagric (U) Ltd, Uganda's largest agricultural 
input supply company focused on the extremely low use of purchased inputs by 
Ugandan small-holders, and the problems faced by the commercial sector in trying to 
develop this market. He emphasised the undermining effect of projects (both relief 
and development) which distribute free or subsidised inputs to farmers. Invariably, a 
portion of these consignments are resold in local markets at less than cost- making it 
very difficult to establish a commercially sustainable distribution system based on 
world market prices. Transport costs are also a problem, with Uganda's landlocked 
status contributing to high cif prices, and poor infrastructure and the dispersed rural 
market adding a further 50-60% by the time agro-inputs reach the farmer. 
Tonneth Gazi provided an interesting alternative commercial perspective, by 
describing the strategy adopted by Agricura - an agro-chemical company in 
Zimbabwe which has deliberately targeted the small-holder sector. A strong technical 
department and depots throughout the country have helped Agricura link to retailers 
and farmers groups, working through their own local co-ordinators, as well as NGOs, 
extension agents and other formal institutions serving the rural sector. 
William Nanyeena's presentation focused on the lessons learnt by the National 
Agricultural Research Organisation on agricultural technology dissemination and 
transfer. He stressed a number of inter-related issues affecting farmer adoption of 
improved technology: the importance of zoning, to develop farmer-relevant 
recommendations; the role of standards and regulation; the promotion of commercial 
distribution networks; the need for more information on economic fertiliser 
application rates; the role of credit; district-level public resources and services; 
potential to explore scope for selective irrigation; and the use of organic fertiliser to 
complement inorganic fertiliser. 
The presentations were followed by group discussions and a plenary session to 
develop final conclusions and recommendations. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
The two working groups addressed: 
• farmer level constraints and strategies for increased use of purchased 
inputs, and 
• issues and strategies for input provision. 
Their conclusions are presented in Boxes 2 and 3. 
Box 2: Farmer-level constraints to increased use of purchased inputs 
----------
s 
--- ---o·- --
Poor availability of inputs in rural Careful targeting of donor support in the market 
areas Distribution through local stockists 
Lobby politicians to reduce free/subsidised in_l)_uts 
Poor input knowledge Use mass media (especially radio) to disseminate 
- general perception, knowledge of information 
technical and economic benefits, and Lead agency to co-ordinate information strategy 
criteria to determine quality of input 
Cost of inputs Make available price information (selected markets) 
Distributors to monitor/advise stockists on prices 
Share distribution networks to reduce costs 
Encourage group (bulk)___Q_urchases 
Output market- Improve farmer market awareness and knowledge 
Demand uncertain and low Reduce production costs so low prices less critical 
Dependency syndrome Requires concerted effort by Government, and 
- expectation of free inputs others, to channel/influence donor assistance 
Low purchasing power Improve farmer productivity 
Concentrate initially on selected crops, areas, inputs 
Strengthen savings mechanisms 
Contradictory messages/signals Lead agency to harmonise messages and formulate 
guidelines 
Commercial systems undermined by Stakeholders should act as pressure group to draw 
well-intentioned subsidised Government's attention to negative effect of well-
interventions intentioned but misguided interventions 
Pack size not commensurate with Make inputs available in appropriate pack size 
size of farming operation 
---
Scope for sele~tive use of group purchase schemes 
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Box 3: issues and strategies for input provision 
Categories of inputs Technical packages 
Planting and stocking materials 
Farm tools, implements and machinery 
Agro-chemicals 
Providers/sources/ channels Government (including local Government) 
Private 
NGOs (and CBOs, and fanner organisations) 
Projects 
Donors 
Issues Strategies 
Weak demand Training and demonstrations 
Provision of information 
Pricing Affordability 
Pack size 
Suitability for small-holder cropping systems 
Product effectiveness Demonstrations 
Record-keeping and data analysis 
Farmer to fanner 
Packaging Labelling, seal, form and aQQro~_riate size 
Product quality Certification, labels/seals (indicate shelf-life) 
Inspections 
Increasing volumes handled Improve infrastructure (especially roads and telephones) 
Financing 
More effective distribution networks 
Handling/storage/transport Health and safety precautions 
Training 
Regulations 
Stores 
Financing to build up distribution and retail network 
Policy and legal framework Policy and legislation supportive ofbusiness 
development, financial services, product quality 
assurance systems, and infrastructure development 
The differing perspectives represented at the workshop resulted in wide-ranging 
discussion. Yet once the working group presentations had been made, four critical 
areas emerged as key issues: 
• communications 
• developing sustainable commercial input distribution systems 
• instability in output markets, and 
• the overall "conditioning environment" which affects farmer choices and 
private sector activity. 
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Communication issues arise at all levels. Frumer-sensitisation is important- to raise 
awareness of input use and to encourage a more "business-like" approach to farming 
operations. Frumers generally have very limited knowledge of purchased inputs, and 
how to use them. There is a need for better information on appropriate application 
regimes, and crop management practices that help farmers get the most benefit from 
purchased inputs. Whilst some of this work has been done, there is a need to update 
and extend it- and to make the results available in an accessible form. Agricultural 
sector support is still very fragmented, with little synergy and consensus amongst the 
various players. The extension service is under-resourced, with considerable district-
wise variation in coverage. The "modernisation of agriculture" policy has helped 
create a shared vision- though even this is open to different interpretations. 
(Odwongo's presentation highlighted the "commercialisation" intrepretation). At all 
levels (frumers, agricultural services and policy), communication flows and linkages 
are critical. 
The high cost and almost absent input distribution networks were a major focus of 
debate. The provision of free or subsidised inputs by Government, projects or NGOs, 
although well-intentioned, was identified as a particular constraint to the 
establishment of sustainable commercial distribution systems. Government's role 
should be concerned with standards, regulation, and possible credit guarantees. The 
importance of actions which facilitate commercial activity, and the need to avoid 
those that undermine private initiative, were stressed. Low volumes currently 
contribute to the high cost of eg., fertiliser - and considerable discussion was focused 
on how to provide support which would raise demand to a level where costs would 
fall because of the higher volumes handled. It is worth noting here that credit was not 
seen as a critical determinant of increased demand. However, it was recognised that 
credit is one tool amongst many that private distributors and retailers might 
nonetheless use, at their own discretion, to increase their sales to small-holders. 
Uncertainty in output markets was identified as a key factor affecting input use, and 
this explains ADC's focus on (a) strengthening farmer marketing strategies whilst 
also trying to encourage greater use of inputs, and (b) reducing per unit production 
costs so that lower output prices, although unwelcome, are less critical. Perishability 
and uncertain harvests lead to inherent instability in crop markets, but for some crops 
in Uganda the instability is extreme. Uganda's location amidst several large countries 
subject to periodic crop failure contributes to this (significant volumes of food crops 
are traded informally across Uganda's borders), and the situation is compounded by 
large relief purchases (particularly of maize) - again mainly for neighbouring 
countries. 
Participants also highlighted the critical importance of the overall conditioning 
environment. Uganda's commercial economy virtually collapsed in the late 70s and 
80s - and in many parts of the country, small-holders retreated into subsistence 
activities. Commercial activity in rural Uganda is still very limited, and there is a lack 
of critical mass in many sub-sectors. Government policy is now firmly pro-private 
sector - yet it will nonetheless take time to resource and develop capacity in the 
"enabling" areas which are now seen as the sphere of government. Increasing levels 
of corruption, if they continue unchecked, may also act as a brake on economic 
development. 
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Where next? 
The issues highlighted in the fmal session have clear implications for further work. 
There is a need to strengthen messages and dissemination mechanisms so that farmers 
can make informed choices. Some of the information is already available, or may 
need fairly straightforward updating, and some will require new research on crop 
management and input application rates. Information on strategies which make 
selective use of purchased inputs alongside soil and water conservation techniques, or 
IPM, may be particularly relevant to resource-poor farmers. Research and extension 
should focus on those cropping systems most relevant to resource-poor risk averse 
farmers. 
Partnership approaches (involving commercial, NGO, CBO and public sector players) 
were viewed as a promising way to extend improved technology. There is already 
some experience and experimentation with such schemes in Uganda- but there is 
scope to develop this further, and to explore potential in poorer less progressive parts 
ofthe country. (The ATAIN programme has worked largely in the agriculturally 
more progressive Mbale area). The decentralisation process in Uganda may offer 
potential to create these synergies and partnerships at the local-level. Decentralised 
extension services are already being partially resourced from district-level donor 
projects and other local initiatives. 
The distribution of seed and fertiliser is particularly critical. Where possible and 
appropriate, private sector provision should be encouraged- and the proposed 
privatisation of the Uganda Seed Project is an important step. The commercial sector 
was also seen as a potentially important source of extension- though the necessary 
conditions to assure impartiality of advice would have to be identified. However, 
under any scenario, farmers are likely to continue using retained or locally available 
seed for a large part of their needs - and consideration should be given to how these 
informal systems might be strengthened. Complementary inputs are also likely to be 
different for these systems, which may give a weaker response to fertiliser, for 
instance. The commercial sector may need better information on traditional farming 
systems, in order to meet the input needs of those farmers. However, for some 
systems and farmers, the need for purchased inputs may be minimal. 
Donor support will be needed to take this agenda forward, and NRI will seek to 
explore further development of these areas with partners in Uganda. 
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Modernization of agriculture and use of purchased inputs by farmers in Uganda 
by Dr W. 0. Odwongo, Principal Policy Analyst, Agricultural Policy Secretariat 
I. Introduction 
Agricultural production system and its peculiarities may be depicted as the "Farm 
Business" illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 
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Whatever the level of its advancement or development, a farm must be considered as a 
business because it uses resources (inputs) to produce outputs for economic purpose. A 
farm business usually comprises of a number of enterprises: e.g. maize, beans, coffee, 
cotton, livestock, poultry horticulture, etc. Each of these enterprises uses some land and 
some labour. The farmer may also improve his enterprises by using modern inputs, the 
aim being to get a greater output. If the farmer gets good prices for his/her outputs, the 
returns will be greater than the costs of inputs, and the farmer will have improved on the 
household income. 
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In developed agricultural systems, farmers require and use large quantities of inputs 
other than land and labour. Such inputs, which originate from elsewhere, must be 
brought to the farm in some cases by farmers themselves but usually by specialized 
dealers in such inputs. Likewise, the outputs of farmers must be taken to be sold or 
consumed in places far away from them. The farm business is thus linked backwards 
into the input markets and forward into output markets. 
There must also be a considerable amount of investment in infrastructure in order to 
sustain the agricultural system. Likewise, research and extension services, farmer 
training, agro-input supply networks, fertilizer and chemical factories, feeder roads, etc 
require large investments. On the marketing side, investments are required for crop 
processing factories, transport fleets to distribute products, marketing institutions, selling 
etc. 
In any country there are thousands, even millions, of farmers with different farm 
businesses. The magnitudes of the total inputs used and the total outputs produced can 
be substantial indeed. These thousands or millions of farm business, including their 
inputs and outputs and the related supporting infrastructure and services, make up the 
agricultural economy. In some countries farmers have invested considerably in their 
farm businesses and they use high levels of inputs which result in high outputs. In others, 
it is not so and low levels of output are associated with low investments and low input 
use. The challenge facing African countries is how to transform their agriculture from 
the present low input/low output systems into high input/high output systems capable of 
meeting the food security and nutritional requirements of a rapidly growing population 
and a modem economy. 
It is in the context of viewing agriculture as a business as described above that we fmd 
ourselves discussing the Modernization of Agriculture Plan. 
IT. Agricultural Sector Policy Reforms Implemented under the Policy Agenda 
Up until end ofthe 1980s, growth in the agricultural sector in Uganda was hampered by 
a series of structural constraints related to: (i) Government and parastatal monopolistic 
control of food and export crop marketing and pricing which inhibited incentives to 
improve the quality and quantity of output; ii)inadequate infrastructure facilities such as 
transportation facilities, bad roads, poor communications facilities etc. iii)shortages of 
foreign exchange for importation of critical agricultural inputs and high and 
unpredictable inflation and physical insecurity. In addition, agricultural growth was 
constrained by a series of institutional factors which included (v) ineffective and 
inefficient Government research and extension services and (vi) segmented, inefficient 
and discriminatory markets for capital, labour, and agricultural inputs. Most of these 
constraints have been removed under the Agricultural Policy Agenda implemented under 
the Economic Recovery Program implemented during the last decade. 
However, although most of the reform programs implemented under the Policy Agenda 
were very successful in reversing the decline in the agricultural sector performance 
recorded during 1970s and 1980s, the sector remains largely undeveloped and unable to 
meet the challenges of a modem economy. There are also still a number of fundamental 
constraints affecting growth in the sector up to today. Some of these constraints, possible 
solutions and the benefits that can be derived in removing them are presented in Annex 
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1. I leave the detailed discussions on them for the main plenary of the workshop 
tomorrow. 
It is in this context that the Modernization of Agriculture Plan was conceived. The plan 
has been set within the framework of the Government's medium term economic policy 
which aims at maintaining macro-economic stability with low inflation, rapid broad 
based economic growth and a viable external balance of payments. Specifically, the 
following specific targets and policies are envisaged for the medium term:-
i) Achieve real GDP rates of7% a year. 
ii) Maintain a competitive exchange rate 
iii) Hold inflation below 5% a year and 
iv) Maintain gross international reserves at around 5 months of imports of goods and 
non-factor services. 
Ill. Rationale for Modernization of Agriculture 
However, we may fmd it appropriate to pause and ask the question - What does 
modernization of agriculture mean and imply? The concept 'modernization of 
agriculture' has to different people a number of different meanings. It may mean 
specialization, monetization and commercialization of the subsistence farm, adoption of 
new technology such as mechanization and use of chemicals, large commercial farms, 
agrarian reforms and strong agro-industries etc. In the Ugandan context, the focus at 
least in the short term is on commercialization of the subsistence farm. But the situation 
is not static and in the long term perspective the focus may be different. I leave to you to 
discuss the possible scenarios for the unfolding of events in the long term perspective as 
the modernization process progresses. 
World-wide experiences demonstrate that modernization of agriculture will propel the 
process of transformation of the economy away from agriculture to non-agriculture 
sectors more rapidly than focussing on any other sector. Moreover, these experiences 
show that once a country gets the agricultural sector growing rapidly, then the country is 
on the high way to mass eradication of poverty. These observations were amply 
illustrated in the context of Uganda in the Technical Workshop on MAP in September 
1998 by the Permanent Secretary/Secretary to the Treasury as follows:-
i) The main engine of growth has to come from technological progress through the 
introduction of new techniques, which increase factor productivity through 
higher yielding seeds and improved agronomic practices. This has the dual 
effect of decreasing the cost of production per unit of output and increasing 
output per unit input. 
ii) The higher incomes arising from technological improvements increase 
household incomes whose increased expenditures on non-farm outputs stimulate 
non-farm non-agricultural growth and increase national income from other 
sectors of the economy. 
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iii) Also the technological change enables the agricultural sector to produce more 
food and allow food prices to decline. However, it is possible for farmers to 
absorb lower food prices because the cost of production per unit output will have 
declined. Thus, it is possible for farmers to absorb lower food prices, which in 
turn leads to the fall in poverty level as it directly improves the real incomes of 
all the poor living in urban areas where they are not producers of food. 
iv) The declining food prices also improve the terms of trade for the manufacturing 
industry and lower the real wage income of employees engaged in the 
manufacturing sector, which should stimulate labour intensive industrialization. 
v) Lower food prices stimulate the growth of labour intensive exports across all 
sectors of the economy and therefore, higher rates of economic growth. The 
large contribution of the agricultural sector to the foreign exchange earnings has 
a significant contribution for financing imports. 
vi) Increased productivity also improves the linkages between the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors of the economy through improved inter-sectoral 
movements of labour and capital. Also the surplus generated by agricultural 
growth contribute to expanding investments in the non-agricultural sector and the 
rest of the economy. 
vii) Modernization of agriculture will lead to rural development as it will entail 
investments in rural infrastructure especially feeder roads, telephones, rural 
electrification, market development, post offices, schools, rural health services 
agricultural research stations, cost effective water harvesting and irrigation 
infrastructure and market based rural credit institutions to provide credit to 
farmers and rural non-farm enterprises. These investments improve the terms of 
trade in rural areas mainly through reduction in transaction costs. 
viii) It is envisaged that the modernization of agriculture would also entail land 
reforms, which would provide security of property rights, develop land markets 
and increase efficient utilization of land and investments. 
IV. Strategy for Modernization of Agriculture 
Government strategy right from the time of conceptualization of the modernization 
process in 1996/97, has been to adopt extensive and consultative as well as consensus 
building strategy involving all stakeholders participating in the agricultural sector. In this 
context, following extensive review of private and public sector roles, Government has 
decided that in the next three to five years, its main thrust for public action, in the 
modernization of agriculture will be to:-
i) finance extension services for smallholders 
ii) finance agricultural research for smallholders 
iii) finance control of epidemic diseases and pests 
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iv) finance capacity building for production of foundation seed 
v) provide regulatory services 
vi) finance collection of agricultural statistical data and production and marketing 
information 
vii) fmance the implementation of land reforms 
viii) fmance capacity building of agriculture related institutions including private, 
NGO and rural financial institutions 
ix) set policies and regulations to foster the expansion of the private sector supply of 
modem inputs and services (including establishment of rural financial services) 
x) construct fish landing sites 
xi) fmance development of irrigation information and capacity building of small 
houses in water harvesting, soil and water conservation. 
In addition the Government will consider whether, and if so in what way, Government 
should:-
xii) fmance the establishment of rural markets for smallholders 
xiii) facilitate the establishment of non-governmental institutions to provide finance 
and risk insurance to smallholders. 
Given the need to focus its limited financial resources the Government will not; 
supply or produce planting materials or other agricultural inputs (except for 
research development purposes and in emergency situations e.g. cassava 
mosaic). 
supply AI services or proven bulls 
process and market agricultural outputs 
subsidize or provide credit directly to farmers 
install irrigation infrastructures. 
Along the above line, Government has now with support from DFID of the UK and 
DANIDA formed a Steering Committee under the Chairmanship of the Permanent 
Secretary/Secretary to Treasury to elaborate and refine the Modernization Plan within 
the next 12 months. Under the Steering Committee there is a technical committee 
comprising technical representatives of all major stakeholders. The Technical 
Committee is charged with the following functions in order to move the Modernization 
Plan forward during the next 12 months. 
12 
i) To identify the resource envelop available for public investment in the sector 
during the medium term period. A tentative budget was submitted to donors in 
the Government Statement on the Modernization Plan during the Consultative 
Group Meeting here in Kampala in December, 1998. 
ii) To carry out a wide range of consultations with stakeholders in order to create a 
shared national vision for the sector. 
iii) To identify the appropriate roles for the central and local Governments as well as 
private sector in the Modernization process. 
iv) To work out a strategy and where appropriate incentives for greater private 
sector investment in the sector. 
v) Work out institutional arrangements required for implementation of the Plan. 
The above tasks have further been divided into ten thematic task areas requiring further 
consultations with stakeholders and indepth analysis and studies before deriving 
workable strategies for the modernization plan. These areas are briefly discussed 
below:-
i) National Vision and Strategy for MAP - The issue here is sensitization, 
education and mobilization of the wider public about the process. 
ii) Agricultural Research and Training - The main issue here is priority setting 
given the limited public resources which is also related to demand driven 
research. Another issue is technology transfer to the main users and the issue of 
private sector participation in agricultural research. 
iii) Agricultural Extension - Agricultural extension performance has generally 
been disappointing so the issue is to fmd alternative and effective approaches to 
extension. The other issue is the role of the various players at the national 
district and sub-county levels in delivering extension services in the 
decentralized arrangement. Related to this is the issue of funding the extension 
services and monitoring as well as accounting for funds in the decentralized 
arrangement. 
iv) Rural Finance - There is still the problem of designing a workable and 
sustainable market based credit delivery mechanism. 
v) Farmer and Private Sector Involvement - The whole strategy of MAP is that 
the bulk of the work and investment 'Will have to be undertaken by the private 
sector. The main issue is therefore, how to trigger and increase private sector 
participation in the program. 
vi) Strengthening of Legal Regulatory and Institutional Arrangements - The 
key issues here are (i) to clearly defme the roles of central Government, Local 
Government and Community authorities in the modernization (ii) to develop 
institutions with physical and human capacity to carry out the modernization 
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process (iii) to defme the legal and regulatory framework for the different 
stakeholders. 
vii) Agro-processing and Marketing - Promotion and development of agro-based 
industries is a key activity. Also development and promotion of marketing 
opportunities, identification of markets, provision of marketing information, etc. 
viii) Land Reforms and Management - Make recommendations on most 
appropriate land reforms and management strategies for the MAP. 
ix) Forestry and Environmental Protection- Handle all issues related to forestry 
and environmental protection. 
x) Resource Envelope and Public Investment - Establish a realistic resource 
envelope for MAP. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The issues pertaining to use of purchased inputs by Ugandan farmers in the 
modernization process are therefore, quite diverse but inter-related and mutually 
reinforcing and in order to derive optimal results from purchased inputs, a holistic 
approach to all these issues is paramount. Tbis is the basic thrust of the modernization of 
agriculture process. 
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Production credit for small-holders growing cotton: Uganda case study 
by Andrew Goodland and Ann Gordon, Natural Resources Institute 
Introduction 
Smallholder access to credit is recognised as a critical constraint to agricultural 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. In the past, credit was sometimes provided by 
public sector institutions - typically parastatals with agricultural marketing 
monopolies, involved in input and output marketing, or state banks. In most countries 
in Africa, the parastatal marketing boards have now been replaced by private traders, 
whilst the state banks have been privatised or forced to reform and tighten their 
operations. This puts the onus of service provision onto the private sector. 
The agricultural supply response to market liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa has 
been extremely variable and often disappointing - particularly for food crops. In 
many areas, it appears that policy-makers overestimated the commercial response to 
market reform, taking insufficient account of the risk, information gaps and high 
transaction costs associated with small-holder marketing. This has left certain regions 
and crops poorly served by marketing networks and associated rural services. 
Despite this, there are situations in which the private sector provides credit to small-
holders - and there is increasing interest in partnership approaches involving the 
commercial sector, NGOs and government. NRI has been conducting research in 
Uganda and Zimbabwe, looking at experiences of commercial provision of credit to 
small-holder farmers for production inputs- with a view to identifying successful 
models with potential application to different situations. The initial research focused 
on the cotton sector in both countries. 
The cotton sector in Uganda 
Uganda's cotton crop is grown entirely by small-holders. Cotton is typically grown in 
rotation with food crops. Yields are low (approximately 300 kg/hectare): although 
pesticides are used, there is negligible use of fertiliser. Production is also constrained 
by draft animal shortages in some of the northern and eastern parts ofUganda, where 
cattle rustling was a problem in the early 90s. The Cotton Development Organisation 
is responsible for the purification and dressing of seed, which farmers now purchase. 
There has been considerable institutional change in the cotton sector. Cotton 
production peaked in 1969/70 at nearly 4 70,000 bales of lint. However, after 1972/73 
production declined dramatically. A Government order issued in 1964 had required 
the ginneries to be taken over by the co-operative unions. Gradually chronic 
management and fmancial problems arose, which together with the poor prices set by 
the Government, undermined farmer confidence in the crop. By 1987/88, production 
had fallen to just 12,000 bales. In 1993, however, the Government commenced a 
programme of cotton sector liberalisation. The ginneries are once more privately-run, 
and cotton production has started to increase again. Production this season (1998/99) 
is expected to be around 150,000 bales. However, small-holder access to and use of 
inputs is still a major issue. 
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Credit for small-holders growing cotton 
Prior to liberalisation, cotton small-holders received inputs (seed and pesticide) on 
credit from the state, which were distributed through the co-operatives. This system 
of input delivery created a dependency on the state, and led small-holders to believe 
that they were receiving inputs free of charge, though in actual fact they were paying 
through lower fanngate prices. With the dismantling of the system, there has been 
concern that small-holders would be unable to access production inputs. This concern 
is most acute among the ginnery owners who have invested in ginnery 
modernisation/rehabilitation, and are dependent upon the small-holder sector for the 
provision of raw material for their ginneries. 
Private non-financial sector initiatives to provide credit to cotton smallholders 
North Bukedi Cotton Company. 
The North Bukedi Cotton Company is one of the largest ginners in the country with 
an annual demand for 15,000 tonnes of seed cotton. The reluctance and/or inability of 
smallholders to pay for inputs during the 1996/7 season prompted North Bukedi to 
consider alternative input delivery arrangements, and as a result inputs (seed and 
pesticides) were provided on credit. During the 1997/8 season, some 78,000 
smallholders across eastern Uganda received seed and pesticide on credit and under 
signed agreements to sell their produce to North Bukedi. North Bukedi also provided 
extension advice to participating farmers. 
The results of this were very disappointing, with a very low recovery rate, and the 
scheme has been discontinued. Small-holders failed to honour the agreements they 
had with North Bukedi. The system broke down due to two main factors: 
• the price offered by North Bukedi for seed cotton was lowered so that the 
company could recover their outlay for inputs; other ginneries were able to offer 
higher prices and purchase from farmers in the scheme; and 
• the weather in 1997/8 was extraordinary (due to the effects of El Nino) and 
particularly detrimental to cotton production, with a drought during the planting 
season and heavy rains during harvesting; the Ugandan crop, originally forecast to 
be 150,000 - 200,000 bales of lint, was in fact closer to 30,000 tonnes. 
Lessons from the North Bukedi experience: 
1. Agreements struck between the company and smallholders were virtually 
impossible to enforce. Attempts to recover loans through the seizure of assets 
(such as bicycles) created hostility and bitterness, and proved unworkable. 
2. Screening and monitoring borrowers, and enforcing repayment, becomes 
increasing expensive and problematic the larger the scale of operation. Effective 
administration of a scheme involving 78,000 smallholders is problematic. 
3. As long as there are other buyers in the market who are able to offer higher prices, 
such interventions are prone to failure (in the absence of enforceable agreements). 
Uganda Ginners and Exporters Association (UGEA) 
The bad experiences ofNorth Bukedi (and Lonrho, which operated a forward buying 
scheme) during the 1997/8 season resulted in heavy losses. Other ginners and 
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exporters also had poor years, in part due to the low harvest. The approach to private 
sector provision of inputs clearly was not working, due primarily to the difficulty of 
enforcing repayment in a competitive market. 
The response has been the establishment of the Uganda Ginners and Exporters 
Association (UGEA), which has been registered as a limited company. All ginners 
and cotton exporters are members of the association. Working closely together, the 
Cotton Development Organisation and the UGEA have developed and implemented a 
new scheme aimed at providing inputs to small-holders. The distribution of the inputs 
is being co-ordinated by the CDO in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Animal Industry and Fisheries. 
When field work was by conducted the authors in the second half of 1998, there was 
considerable optimism about the scheme, which appeared to be working well, despite 
some initial problems. The size of the harvest, and the ability to sustain and increase 
output in subsequent years will be the real test of this approach. The following apear 
to be particularly critical to the scheme's success: 
1. timely distribution of inputs on a large-scale requires a sophisticated distribution 
system; there were some delays in distribution in 1998, but since these were not 
too severe, the harvest may not have suffered greatly; and 
2. input costs are recouped through a levy payable on volume of cotton ginned; to 
minimise levy avoidance, independent monitors have been placed at each ginnery, 
and border officials and local spinners briefed on the potential problem of illegal 
sales, although it is not yet clear whether these measures are adequate. 
In addition there are three issues which have implications for the sustainability of the 
scheme: 
• a large potential problem relates to how the scheme has been set up. Inputs are 
provided on credit, but the repayment is based on volume of output, rather than 
volume of input. The result is that the smallholders have no incentive to use the 
inputs prudently. For example, a smallholder may take enough pesticide to treat 
10 hectares, but only treat one hectare, and fmd an alternative use for the 
remaining pesticide (used on other crops or sold). The individual farmer is not 
penalised for this, as the repayment is made via a flat rate deduction on the price 
of seed cotton, irrespective of how much input was used. Whilst extension advice 
and monitoring may reduce such abuses, it is unlikely that this will eliminate the 
problem altogether. 
• the scheme is vulnerable to covariate risk, for instance if climatic conditions led to 
widespread crop failure and consequent mass default by the ginneries. 
• the long-term financial sustainability of the scheme is difficult to assess as 
currently the interest rates obtained on the input loan are below commercial 
market interest rates, and the loan is guaranteed by the Ugandan Government. 
Moreover, the logistical support provided by the Cotton Development 
Organisation is presently provided free of charge. 
22 
Alternative sources of credit for cotton smallholders 
In addition to the private non-financial sector, there are several potential sources of 
credit for cotton farmers: 
1. from initiatives/interventions taken by the public sector to target credit to cotton 
farmers 
2. from initiatives taken by the public sector to target credit at smallholders in 
general 
3. from the formal commercial banking and financial sector 
4. from the semi-formal micro-finance sector, including NGOs 
5. from the informal sector. 
Although there are several pilot schemes underway currently, and considerable 
interest in innovative ways to increase small-holder access to credit, none of these 
alternative sources provide a sustainable, reliable and widespread source of credit for 
smallholder activities at the present time. As a consequence, the private sector cotton 
ginneries have had to play a leading role in supplying credit. 
Experience with input credit in other sectors 
Tobacco: BAT operate a sophisticated and successful input credit scheme in a 
competitive market. For 1998, BAT has entered into agreements with 48,000 
smallholders who cultivate tobacco on an average of 0.3 hectares. 
Key lessons: 
• Guaranteed prices announced before start of the season 
• Law to safeguard farmers and company 
• Trust between the company and smallholders built up over time 
• Distribution system ensuring timely delivery of inputs and payment for produce. 
• Strong extension support 
Vanilla: A company called UV AN Ltd works with a vanilla growers association, and 
has successfully operated a input credit scheme. The basis for the success of this 
scheme is the close relationship and trust between the company and the association. 
With respect to the credit system, the transaction costs of screening and monitoring 
are lowered by their transfer to the association, which has the incentive to ensure that 
loans are repaid so as not to jeopardise the relationship with (and income from) 
UVAN. 
Experiences of ADC: 
ADC has had mixed experiences with outgrower/input credit schemes. The most 
common problem is the presence of multi-marketing channels. When there is more 
than one marketing channel, growers can often avoid loan repayment by selling their 
crop to another buyer - leading to the collapse of the schemes. However, ADC is 
currently involved in a number of innovative input schemes, which appear to have 
met with more success. 
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Small-holder access to credit - some lessons 
The case study of the cotton sector ofUganda and the insights gained from other 
sectors can be used to identify the characteristics of an agricultural commodity system 
which potentially lends itself to private non-financial sector provision of credit. 
1. Low degree of transferability of credit. 
If repayment is to be collected at the time of crop purchase, it is important that the 
credit supplied must be put to the right use - i.e. for the production of the crop in 
question. To a certain extent, this can be achieved by providing the credit in kind, i.e., 
actually providing the input (for example seed, pesticides). Providing cash carries a 
large risk ofbeing diverted for other expenditures. 
2. Lack of alternative uses for output. 
If the output has any value other than to the processor or trader providing the credit, 
then there is a risk that not all of the produce will be available for purchase by the 
credit provider. This is particularly relevant for food crops which can be consumed at 
the household level or sold in food markets. In this scenario, the household is 'free-
riding' on the inputs supplied by the lender, and the lender therefore cannot capture 
the full benefit of the inputs. 
3. Mechanisms exist to ensure recovery of the credit 
Strategic default or side marketing - when the smallholder decides to sell to a buyer 
other than the lender- is a common problem in implementing such credit schemes. 
Three options are available to avoid this: 
Enforcing repayment. Recovery of loans can be enforced where agreements made 
between a private sector lender and the smallholder borrower are legally binding and 
taking legal action against defaulters is possible. Collateral can be used to secure 
loans, and may be seized. 
Creating incentives for repayment. If the borrower has a strong incentive to repay the 
loan, strategic default is less likely. The most common incentive to the smallholder 
will be the maintenance of a working relationship with the lender. If smallholders 
recognise the benefit of entering into an agreement with a specific private actor, then 
they have an incentive not to jeopardise the future benefits of maintaining that 
relationship. 
Removing the option o(strategic default. Strategic default can only happen when 
there is more than one buyer in the market. Where there is a geographic monopoly, 
non-fungibility of inputs, and a lack of alternate uses for the output, then the potential 
exists for a credit scheme. However, especially after economic liberalisation, this is 
rarely the case. Unless a monopoly can be mimicked by cooperation between buyers, 
strategic default is likely. This has been the approach in the cotton sector with the 
formation of the UGEA effectively removing the possibility of escaping repayment of 
the loan. 
4. Private sector has incentive and means to provide credit. 
The private sector will only take the initiative to develop a smallholder credit scheme 
ifthere is a benefit in doing so. Certainly, if capital investments have been made (for 
instance in processing facilities) there is a strong incentive. This is the case for 
processors (for example in the cotton and tobacco sectors). 
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Sufficient liquidity is a pre-requisite: access to funds to make loans to smallholders. 
Larger, international companies have an advantage here, as they do not have to rely 
on domestic sources of financing, though if they did approach the banking sector for 
loans, they are more likely to secure loans than smaller traders and processors. 
The above four conditions appear to be essential for the success of private non-
financial sector provision of credit. In addition however, there is also a set of 
facilitating conditions which may enhance the potential success of this approach. 
Monitoring systems and extension services 
Efficient and effective use of the inputs provided will increase the chances of 
sufficient production to pay offthe loan. Appropriate use of inputs can be ensured 
through extension advice and monitoring of smallholders. 
Lowering transaction costs. 
The transaction costs associated with the operation of an input credit scheme include 
the costs of screening smallholders, distributing inputs, monitoring the use of inputs, 
and collecting the harvest. These costs are ultimately passed down to smallholders via 
lower prices for their output, and if they can be reduced then theoretically 
smallholders stand to increase their incomes (though this will depend on their 
bargaining power), and therefore their incentive to participate in such a scheme. 
Farmer groups and associations may have an important role in this respect, as they 
can take on responsibilities for screening, distribution, monitoring and bulking up, and 
provide a contact point for group extension activities. 
Potential applications to other sectors in Uganda 
Food crops. A wide variety of food crops are grown in Uganda, including maize, 
beans, sorghum, millet, rice, cassava, bananas (matooke), sweet potato, groundnuts 
and Irish potato. These are crops which are produced for household production and 
traded in local markets. Production is low input, with a heavy reliance on household 
labour. If processed, much of this is done at household level. Some of these 
commodities may be exported to regional markets, for example maize and beans. 
Theoretically, traders could provide inputs, especially improved seed, on credit in 
return for access to the crop for marketing. Similarly, input suppliers could provide 
inputs on credit- particularly if this were directly linked to output marketing, or 
linked indirectly through an arrangement with output purchasers. However there is 
very little evidence of this happening. 
Food crops do not appear to be good candidates for private non-fmancial sector credit. 
• Food crops can be consumed in the household, or traded locally, so there is a 
significant risk for the trader of not recovering the crop/loan. 
• There are many potential buyers, increasing the likelihood of strategic default. 
• Traders, especially small-scale local traders, who have the advantage of local 
information and monitoring, may not have access to finance, given the reluctance 
of the commercial banking sector to lend to the agricultural sector. 
• Input usage is low- hence demand for credit may also be low. 
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Traditional export crops 
Coffee: Yields could be improved by replacing old trees or increasing the use of agro-
chemicals. Credit may have a role to play in any programmes to increase productivity. 
The largest potential constraint to the involvement of processors and exporters would 
appear to be the fierce competition and large number of buyers, though as has been 
seen in the cotton sector, such constraints can be overcome. There is evidence of 
advance buying of coffee - local agents are contracted by coffee processors and 
exporters to make advance purchases of coffee from smallholders. The money 
provided from the exporters and processors, via the local agents, could in theory be 
channelled to purchasing inputs and to pay for labour for harvesting. 
Tea: Tea production consists oflarge and small estates, complemented by smallholder 
outgrowers with land areas averaging less than 1 0 hectares. There are no significant 
alternative uses for the tea crop, and this is clearly important in the potential success 
of input credit schemes. Multiple buyers in the market is a potential problem: there is 
evidence that some of the estate factories have purchased from outgrowers to improve 
their capacity utilisation. 
High value export crops: Recently, a number of high value crops (for example 
chillies, vanilla, ginger, roses) have emerged as potentially profitable smallholder 
crops. There is considerable potential for outgrower schemes for these crops. Both 
smallholders and the companies involved stand to benefit from the schemes and 
therefore have incentives to make the schemes work. 
Edible Oils: Vegetable oils in Uganda have traditionally been derived from 
groundnut, sesame, cottonseed, shea and more recently from sunflower and soya 
bean. There are also plans to introduce oil palm. Some oilseeds may offer potential 
for private provision of credit. Groundnuts are traditionally used as a valuable whole 
food, and their cost precludes significant use in oil extraction in Uganda. Similarly, 
sesame is used as a food crop. For both groundnuts and sesame, the problem of the 
diversion of the crop to household consumption is likely to rule them out as potential 
crops for input credit. 
Sunflower may have more potential as a candidate for input credit, and farmer interest 
in sunflower has increased with the introduction of small-scale processing options and 
high oil yielding seed. Oil palm may also be a suitable candidate for credit -
particularly as there is no tradition in Uganda ofhousehold-level processing or direct 
food-use of the fruit. 
Conclusions 
Market liberalisation and the provision of credit. 
The use of purchased inputs by smallholders remains low in Uganda. Smallholders, 
who were previously dependent upon inefficient state systems for the provision of 
inputs, are now increasingly dependent upon the private sector. Credit has an 
important role to play in increasing access to inputs. The commercial banking sector 
may eventually provide loans for agriculture, and small holders - but this will take 
time. Likewise for the semi-formal micro-fmance sector: in time they may return to 
the agricultural sector, but it is currently regarded as high risk. Legislative support to 
recognise the semi-formal micro-finance institutions may help, plus the sharing of 
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experiences. The removal of marketing monopolies and the introduction of 
competition place considerable strain on the operation of input supply-output 
marketing linkages, by greatly increasing the scope for strategic default by farmers. 
However, these problems can be overcome (see cotton and tobacco). 
Private non-financial sector credit versus alternative sources of credit. 
The private non-financial sector has taken the lead in the provision of inputs in several 
sectors. Clearly though, this approach is not appropriate to all commodity systems, 
and the study has attempted to identify some key conditions that need to be in place 
for such an approach to work. Alternative sources of credit, notably the commercial 
banking sector and semi-formal micro-finance institutions, are currently reluctant to 
lend for agricultural activities, though there are several initiatives underway to try and 
overcome this. However, these schemes are medium to long term programmes. 
Hopefully, they will lead to the creation ofviable and sustainable delivery systems 
which will be applicable to the whole of the rural economy, not just specific 
commodities. 
However, the private input credit schemes do have potential for the short term at least, 
and it may be possible to identify other sectors where the private non-financial sector 
approach could work. Private provision of credit, linked to output marketing, may in 
fact offer considerable advantages over alternative sources: 
• It is the interest of the lender to ensure that good quality inputs are used, and that 
these inputs are used so as to maximise their effectiveness. Credit may therefore 
be linked to monitoring and extension services (for example see tobacco and 
vanilla above) which serve to increase productivity and hence incomes for 
smallholders. These income-enhancing services are generally not available from 
alternative sources of credit. 
• It is also in the interest of the lenders to deliver inputs on time; commercial bank 
loan application and disbursement procedures are often time-consuming and 
therefore risk late provision of inputs. 
However, it is also important that non-financial institutions benefit from the 
experiences of the financial institutions. When non-financial entities get involved with 
credit provision, they need to be aware of the risks and risk-avoidance mechanisms. If 
not, then they could incur significant losses (as did both Lonrho and the North Bukedi 
Cotton Company during the 97/98 season). 
The input credit schemes reviewed here have considerable potential in several 
commodity systems in Uganda, though these are exclusively for non-food crops. The 
schemes both increase availability of and access to inputs. They offer scope for wider 
application because: 
• they can operate in a competitive market. 
• incentives exist to provide inputs on credit to smallholders and for smallholders to 
use those inputs efficiently. 
Screening, monitoring and enforcement issues are addressed using mechanisms which 
are effective and minimise transaction costs. 
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Production credit for small-holders growing cotton: Zimbabwe case study 
by Andrew Goodland and Ann Gordon, Natural Resources Institute 
Introduction 
Smallholder access to agricultural services (financial services, inputs, extension, 
output marketing) is recognised as a critical constraint to agricultural development in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This is especially the case for those countries which have 
dismantled or reformed public sector institutions which previously had service 
provision responsibilities. These parastatal organisations typically had monopolies on 
the provision of inputs and the marketing of agricultural produce. Their withdrawal 
has put the onus of service provision onto the private sector. 
The agricultural supply response to market liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa has 
been variable but often disappointing, particularly for food crops. In many areas, it 
appears that policy-makers overestimated the commercial response to market reform, 
taking insufficient account of the risk, information gaps and high transaction costs 
associated with small-holder marketing. This has left certain regions and crops poorly 
served by marketing networks and associated rural services. 
Despite this, there are situations in which the private sector provides credit to small-
holders - and there is increasing interest in partnership approaches involving the 
commercial sector, NGOs and government. NRI has been conducting research in 
Uganda and Zimbabwe, looking at experiences of commercial provision of credit to 
small-holder farmers for production inputs - with a view to identifying successful 
models with potential application to different situations. The initial research focused 
on the cotton sector in both countries. 
Private sector cotton companies in Zimbabwe have taken initiatives to provide 
services to smallholder cotton farmers. By linking the provision of credit, input supply 
and extension advice to the marketing of seed cotton, the companies have contributed 
significantly to the recent increase in smallholder cotton production. Their approaches 
provide lessons for other smallholder sub-sectors and demonstrate the potential for 
private sector involvement in the provision of agricultural services, which have been 
threatened by fiscal tightening and state withdrawal associated with economic reform. 
The cotton sector in Zimbabwe 
During the past decade there has been a marked shift in the pattern of cotton 
production. Large-scale production, with high levels of inputs and mechanisation, has 
declined, whilst smallholder production has grown. Smallholders typically cultivate 
cotton on small unirrigated plots with high labour inputs. This increase in smallholder 
production (which by the 1996/1997 season accounted for 72 percent of a total of 
273,000 tonnes of seed cotton harvested) can be attributed to a number of factors, 
including: the perception of cotton as a drought tolerant crop; renewed confidence in 
securing cash income for seed cotton; and improved production services. The total 
number of smallholder cotton producers had reached approximately 200,000 by 1998. 
(By contrast large-scale commercial farmers were using profits generated by cotton to 
invest in more lucrative irrigated crops - notably flowers and fresh produce for 
export). 
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Yields in the smallholder sector are much lower than those in the large scale farming 
sector, averaging 740 kg/ha in 199611997. Low yields are a result of a combination of 
factors, including: rainfed production; poor soils; limited access to inputs; and poor 
crop management. 
Prior to 1994, the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) had a monopoly on the purchase of 
seed cotton. Since then, the CMB has been privatised (although the Government have 
retained a 25% share) and has become the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe 
(subsequently referred to as 'Cottco'). Since 1994, anyone is allowed to purchase 
seed cotton, and by 1998 there were three cotton companies: Cottco, Cotpro, and 
Cargill. 
Credit for smallholders: 
Credit for smallholders increases access to inputs, and therefore has a role to play in 
increasing smallholder productivity. However, small-holder access to credit is limited, 
and in practice smallholders use their own savings, or depend on remittances from 
relatives to make cash purchases. In times of extreme need, farmers may forward sell 
their crop to traders, but these "green loans" are provided on terms which are very 
poor for the farmer. 
The commercial financial sector has minimal involvement with smallholders due to 
the perceived high risks of rain-fed crop cultivation, and the inability of smallholders 
to meet banking requirements, including the provision of collateral. For these reasons 
there is a very low banking presence in rural areas. The Agricultural Finance 
Corporation is a parastatal institution set up specifically to provide credit to the 
agricultural sector. It has had a mixed history, and has not been able to provide 
financial services to smallholders on a sustainable basis. Subsidised credit was 
available to all smallholders during the 1980s, though the high default rate and cash 
flow constraints have forced AFC to become far more disciplined in their approach to 
smallholder lending. Consequently, since the late 1980s there has been a steady 
reduction in the number of clients and in the amount loaned and AFC now has a much 
smaller clientele, though more reliable. AFC now plan to become an agricultural 
development bank and were expecting the license to be granted in late 1998. This will 
enable AFC to mobilise savings. With their extensive network in rural areas, the 
Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe, as it will be known, should be well placed to provide 
financial services to the agricultural sector. 
Other sources of credit and financial services, such as non-governmental 
organisations, have not reached smallholders to any significant extent. 
Private sector provision of credit: 
The cotton companies have taken an active role in supplying services, including 
credit, to small holders. The reasons for this can be attributed to: 
1. The increased share of production by smallholders has meant that all three cotton 
companies are dependent to some extent on securing a supply of seed cotton from 
these producers. They have therefore sought means to increase the supply from 
smallholders by providing production services (input supply, credit and 
extension). 
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2. Excess ginning capacity within the country has heightened competition between 
the cotton companies, which have sought means of securing access to seed cotton. 
One way of achieving this is to link the marketing of seed cotton to the provision 
of production services. 
3. The general paucity of agricultural services available to smallholders from other 
sources, especially those in remoter areas, has left the cotton companies with little 
option than to become involved in production credit and input supply. 
Two of the three cotton companies (Cottco and Cotpro) have provided services to 
smallholders through input credit schemes. Input credit schemes involve the provision 
of production inputs on credit to farmers by the cotton companies, which recover the 
loans by having exclusive purchase rights on seed cotton produced by those farmers. 
The challenges of providing input credit to smallholders are the same as for all credit 
activities: 
1. Screening potential borrowers to assess their creditworthiness and likelihood of 
repayment; 
2. Providing credit in the right form and at the right time; 
3. Monitoring to ensure that the credit is used productively; 
4. Ensuring repayment of the loan 
Avoiding default is the principal aim ofthe creditor. Default can be due to the genuine 
inability of a borrower to repay or it can be strategic. 'Strategic default' occurs when 
the borrower defaults on a loan intentionally. This may occur when the borrower 
believes that repayment can be avoided without jeopardising future income or access 
to credit. 'Strategic default' can occur where there are multiple buyers and 'side-
marketing' is possible. 'Side-marketing' refers to farmers taking credit from one 
buyer but avoiding repayment by selling to another. For example, prior to the full 
liberalisation of seed cotton marketing, this was not a problem as the CMB was the 
only buyer of seed cotton. However, with three cotton companies now competing in 
the market, each being supplied by farmers and marketing middlemen, the problem of 
side-marketing has emerged. Currently, two of the three cotton companies are 
operating credit schemes. The experiences of the three cotton companies are 
summarised below. 
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe 
The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco) is the largest company in the cotton 
sector, accounting for around 70% of seed cotton purchases and processing. Cottco 
was formed from the privatisation ofthe Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) in 1994. 
Cottco's input credit scheme started in 1992/1993 season after the severe drought of 
1992 and money was made available from the World Bank to finance the scheme. 
The scheme uses a number of mechanisms to minimise default: 
• Credit is extended in the form of physical inputs (seed, fertiliser and pesticide) to 
farmer groups. The whole group is penalised if one member defaults, so there is 
an incentive for peer policing to ensure repayment. Groups are self-selecting, 
though all new members have to be able to demonstrate that they have a good 
track record in cotton cultivation. The size of groups has declined during the 
lifetime of the scheme. 
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• Considerable effort is made to forge close relationships between the company and 
the participating smallholders. Local Cottco agents are in year-round contact with 
smallholders, and additional services are provided by the company, including 
extension advice. 
• Monetary rewards are given to groups with high repayment rates. Defaulters are 
followed up quickly and assets, such as cattle, can be seized. A debt collector has 
been contracted for this purpose. 
In 1998, 50,000 smallholders were in the scheme. The repayment rate for the 97/98 
season was 98 percent.In addition to those smallholders in the input credit scheme, 
many other smallholders purchase inputs from Cottco. Farmers also benefit from 
technical advice, for instance a weekly radio broadcast for cotton growers. The 
scheme is becoming increasingly sophisticated. In an expansion of the scheme, Cottco 
has recently introduced individual cash loans to farmers with a good history who are 
achieving high production. Furthermore, the Cottco scheme is insured. The risks 
covered are: death; permanent disability; sickness; and general default. Participants in 
the scheme are automatically covered as soon as they draw inputs from the scheme. 
Although the Cottco experience has been largely positive, at the outset it was 
dependent on soft loans from the World Bank ( channeled via the Zimbabwean 
Government). Without access to these funds, the scheme would have had to charge 
significantly higher interest rates during its crucial start-up phase. 
Cotpro 
Cotpro's input scheme is similar to Cottco's, though on a smaller scale with 5,000 
farmers in 1998. It too uses a group lending approach and incentives for high 
repayment rates. The company has developed a network of distribution/collection 
points in areas where the scheme operates, and employs a number of local agents to 
implement the scheme. The scheme has been very successful, with full recovery of 
loans (up to 1998). Cotpro plan to expand the scheme modestly (up to around 8,000 
smallholders), believing that the administrative and logistical burden of a larger 
scheme would threaten its successful operation. Unlike Cottco, Cotpro has not 
benefited from international donor funds, and has instead used funds from a number 
of different sources, including internal company funds and loans from the 
Development Division of AFC. Interest rates charged to smallholders are higher than 
those charged by Cottco, but significantly lower than prevailing market rates. 
Car gill 
Cargill does not operate an input credit scheme, and has no plans to do so. Company 
officials regard input credit as unecessary because their supply requirements can be 
met by large-scale producers and from smallholders which are outside the other 
companies' input credit schemes. In addition, Cargill staff wish to avoid the 
significant administrative burden they perceive from operating such a service. Instead 
of being offered credit, farmers can purchase inputs for the following season when 
they sell their seed cotton to Cargill, without any obligation to sell the next season's 
crop to Cargill. Such a system has the advantage of not indebting smallholders, who 
in the current economic climate (November 1998 year-on-year inflation was 35%, and 
market interest rates were over 40%) may be reluctant to take credit for fear oflong 
term indebtedness. High inflation also makes advance purchase of inputs attractive to 
those farmers who can afford to do so. 
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Conclusions from input credit schemes in the cotton sector 
The credit schemes of both Cotpro and Cottco appear to be successful in terms of 
repayment and both companies have been able to secure a significant proportion of 
their seed cotton requirements through their input credit schemes. The total number of 
smallholders currently benefiting from the schemes numbers approximately 55,000-
out of an estimated 200,000 small-holders producing cotton. In Zimbabwe, many 
farmers are clearly able to grow cotton without credit, since most farmers use their 
own resources to purchase inputs. 
The challenges of offering credit have been met through a combination of strategies: 
• Screening of potential borrowers is performed by the group members who realise 
that they stand to lose if an unreliable farmer joins their group. In addition, both 
Cotpro and Cottco employ local agents who have local knowledge and are 
therefore in a position to assess the credentials of loan applicants. 
• Close monitoring of the farmers throughout the season and links with the 
extension services (Agritex) ensure that the smallholders are putting the inputs to 
good use, thereby increasing the chances of loan repayment. 
• Tying in extension services with the input credit scheme serves both to increase 
the productivity of those inputs, and also helps to create a closer relationship 
between the company and the smallholder, and smallholder loyalty to the 
particular company supplying credit. 
• Incentives are offered for good repayment, whilst defaulters are dealt with swiftly. 
• Generally, a combination of instilling financial discipline and weeding out 
potential defaulters has created a reliable clientele. 
Future of the schemes 
Neither Cottco nor Cotpro charge market interest rates in their programmes. This 
casts doubt over the long term sustainability of the schemes. Furthermore, the 
schemes have been operating during a period of relatively good production 
conditions, and therefore the companies involved have not had to confront the 
problem of mass default from severe crop failure (as there was in the 1991/2 season). 
Severe droughts are a fairly regular occurrence in Zimbabwe and so it would seem 
that it is only a matter of time before this problem will need to be addressed. Rolling 
the debt over to the following year is one possible response, though this would require 
the companies to find additional funds. Nevertheless, Cottco were able to recover 
from poor loan repayment experienced in the first year following liberalisation -
suggesting that there may be sufficient liquidity or access to loans to cover poor 
harvests. 
Key conditions for the success of input credit schemes. 
The success of the input credit schemes in the cotton sector raises the question of 
whether such an approach could be applicable to other agricultural sub-sectors. The 
experiences of the cotton sector in Zimbabwe, together with the fmdings from related 
research by the authors in Uganda, reveal a set of desirable conditions for input credit 
schemes. 
1. Low degree of transferability of credit: if the credit can be used for a different 
purpose (for instance, cash is highly fungible), there is a chance that it will be put 
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to a non- productive use, increasing the risk of default. Providing credit in the 
form of inputs minimises this. 
2. Lack of alternative uses for output: when the output can be disposed of in a 
number of ways (for example, household consumption, local marketing or 
household processing), this reduces the likelihood that it will be used to repay the 
loan. Cotton, and other non-consumable and export crops, have limited value to 
smallholders. 
3. Mechanisms are available to ensure the recovery of credit, for instance the use of 
groups and other incentives to encourage repayment and discourage default. 
4. The private sector has an incentive and means to provide credit: incentives from 
having a need or benefit to operate a scheme, for example to maintain the 
utilisation rates of fixed assets such as ginneries; means from having access to 
sufficient funds to operate the scheme. 
Input credit and smallholders in Zimbabwe 
Input credit has been tried in a number of agricultural sub-sectors in Zimbabwe, with 
mixed results (see Box 1). 
Box 1: Smallholder crops and input credit: experiences and potentiaL 
High value horticulture crops (including babycorn, paprika): Outgrower schemes 
have been used to produce high-value horticultural crops for export markets. Such 
schemes are elaborate input credit schemes, with far higher involvement of the 
company in crop cultivation. Production generally requires intensive use of inputs, 
including irrigation which is not available to most smallholders in Zimbabwe. For 
small plots, small-holders may use bucket irrigation - and some companies involve 
large numbers of small-holders, each growing very small volumes. 
Maize: Household consumption and local marketing have thwarted the successful 
operation of input credit for maize production in the past. The Grain Marketing Board 
is now proposing to launch a new scheme modelled on the cotton sector. However 
state intervention in maize markets may dampen private sector incentives to 
participate in input credit. 
Soyabean: despite interest in promoting smallholder production of soyabean, oil 
processors have no incentive to launch input credit schemes as they can secure 
sufficient supplies from the commercial sector, where soya is grown for animal feed. 
Groundnut: one input credit scheme is operating. The company involved (Reapers) 
has overcome the potential problem of household consumption by developing close 
ties with smallholders. With close monitoring of smallholders, and by instilling a 
sense ofloyalty to the company, the risk of default is mimimised. 
Sorghum: Chibuku Breweries used to offer input credit for red sorghum. However, 
this was discontinued because, being the only major buyer, the brewery saw no need 
to operate the scheme to assure its supplies. The company does still distribute seed 
from its depots. Little use is made of agro-chemicals in sorghum production. 
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Alternative approaches to increasing smallholder access to inputs. 
The experiences of the cotton sector demonstrate that even though input credit 
schemes are available, the majority of small-holders (around 70 percent) purchase 
inputs with cash from retailers or cotton companies. Access to inputs has two 
elements: firstly that farmers have the means (cash or credit) to obtain the input; and 
secondly, that the inputs are available. The cotton schemes address both of these 
elements. Other schemes focus on the availability issue. 
The non-governmental organisation, CARE, has a programme which guarantees 
short-term input loans made by distributors to rural retailers, who in turn sell the 
inputs to smallholders. The performance of the programme is very encouraging. In its 
first year (1996/97) about Z$4 million worth of inputs were sold to farmers and 95 
percent of repayments have been made on time. 
A private company, Agricura, which manufactures and distributes agro-chemicals, has 
specifically targeted smallholders for its products. The chemicals are packaged in 
small quantities to suit smallholder production, and a network of agents, who are paid 
on commission, spread awareness of the company and organise field days for farmers 
to purchase inputs and receive guidance on their usage. 
Conclusions 
In the absence of alternative sources of agricultural services, the role played by the 
cotton companies in increasing access to inputs is significant, especially the input 
credit scheme of Cottco. Cottco is largest single source of credit for smallholders in 
Zimbabwe, even though it is not a fmancial institution. It has developed its own 
methodology for lending. Micro-finance institutions could learn from Cottco' s 
approach, whilst Cottco might benefit from software developed by micro-finance 
institutions - to manage the scheme as it becomes increasingly sophisticated. Cottco 
have recently started to provide cash loans to individuals, thereby becoming more 
akin to a micro-finance institution. 
In other sectors, theoretically there is potential for both input suppliers and output 
purchases to be involved in input credit schemes. There are difficulties: unless input 
supply is explicitly linked to output marketing, recovery may be difficult. Input 
companies have therefore focussed their credit scheme efforts at the retailer/agent 
level (for instance CARE programme). Alternatively, input suppliers have sought to 
increase the availability of inputs to smallholders (see Agricura above), without 
providing credit. Output buyers (processors, exporters) have been more reluctant to be 
involved with credit schemes. The situation in Zimbabwe, with a sizeable large-scale 
commercial sector means that only in certain commodity sectors (such as cotton) is 
dependence on smallholder production critical, and therefore there is little incentive to 
launch input credit schemes. None of the large agro-processors have a need to embark 
on input credit schemes as they can access all their raw material from the commercial 
farming sector. 
Financial discipline appears to be strengthening in Zimbabwe, and has certainly 
improved much over the past decade, as demonstrated by the improvement in 
performance of the AFC and Cottco schemes. Good financial discipline significantly 
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increases the chances of success of operating input credit schemes, and even raises the 
possibility of transferring the approach to commodities where side-marketing or 
household consumption is a real possibility (for instance for food crops). 
Despite the success of the cotton input credit schemes, there is a question mark over 
their sustainability because of their dependence on below-market interest rates. There 
has been no experience of charging market rates - though it should not be assumed 
that the schemes could not operate at the higher rates. Of more concern are the general 
economic conditions in Zimbabwe at present. High inflation and interest rates do not 
encourage rural finance. Savings rates are currently negative (in real terms). High 
nominal interest rates discourage smallholders from taking credit: investment in assets 
is seen as preferable, where it is an option. Purchasing inputs at the time of sale of 
seed cotton may become more popular, though storage of inputs may pose some 
problems. 
The cotton company schemes have clearly extended and expanded access to inputs, 
but credit is only part of the solution to increasing input use. Many small-holders in 
Zimbabwe are able to purchase inputs without credit - and the availability of inputs in 
rural areas is at least as important as credit. 
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Credit provision for small-holder farmers: lessons from Uganda and Zimbabwe 
by Andrew Goodland and Ann Gordon, Natural Resources Institute 
Introduction. 
The agricultural supply response to market liberalisation in Africa has been extremely 
variable, but often disappointing- particularly for food crops. For some crops and 
regions, it seems that policy-makers over-estimated commercial willingness to 
become involved in the marketing of small-holder production. Perceived risk, poor 
information and high transaction costs have contributed to an often weak commercial 
presence in the more marginal or remote areas. Yet the parastatals that formerly 
provided output and input marketing services, sometimes with a credit component, 
have been largely dismantled. This leaves a critical gap in the provision of 
agricultural marketing and associated rural services. 
Smallholder access to agricultural services (financial services, inputs, extension, 
output marketing) is recognised as a critical factor in achieving productivity gains. 
State withdrawal puts the onus on the commercial sector to provide these services -
and there is particular interest in partnership approaches which build on the 
competences of commercial, non-governmental and public players. 
NRI has been conducting preliminary research on the conditions necessary for private 
provision of credit to small-holders. The initial research has focused on differing 
experiences from the cotton sectors in Uganda and Zimbabwe - where private cotton 
companies are involved in small-holder credit programmes- with a view to 
identifying other sectors or situations where these models could be applied. 
Uganda and Zimbabwe have both recently been through periods of market 
liberalisation. Private companies in the cotton sectors of both countries have taken 
initiatives to provide agricultural services to cotton smallholders. The approaches 
taken in each country are markedly different, despite similarities in the problems 
faced. However, in both cases there are considerable grounds for optimism, with 
smallholder cotton production increasing, in part because of the credit schemes. Input 
credit schemes involve the provision of production inputs on credit to farmers by 
companies, which recover the loans by having exclusive purchase rights to the 
produce of those fanners. The schemes in both countries are still in their infancy, and 
questions remain over their sustainability, though they provide many lessons for the 
successful operation of input credit schemes in cotton and other sub-sectors. 
Cotton sector development in Uganda and Zimbabwe 
There are some parallels between the development of the cotton sub-sectors in 
Uganda and Zimbabwe, but also differences that help to explain the characteristics of 
the input credits schemes. 
Similarities: 
• Both Uganda and Zimbabwe have a long history of cotton production. 
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• Both countries have recently liberalised their cotton sectors. Prior to 1994, state 
parastatals held monopolies on the marketing of seed cotton. Market liberalisation 
has resulted in competitive purchasing markets. 
• The market and state reforms have led to changes in local availability of inputs 
(seed, fertilisers and pesticides) for small-holders 
• The small-holder sectors of both economies are poorly served by financial 
institutions (commercial banking sector, non-governmental organisations, 
parastatals), and there is little access to credit for small-holder crop production. 
• The cotton sectors of both countries have received considerable support in recent 
years to regenerate the industries. In Zimbabwe, severe drought in 1992 had 
disastrous consequences for the whole agricultural sector. In Uganda, years of 
inefficient management of the cotton sector had dramatically reduced output and 
smallholder interest in growing the crop. In both cases, World Bank funds have 
been allocated to the cotton sector to aid recovery. 
Differences: 
• The structure of the agricultural sectors is different in the two countries. 
Zimbabwe has a significant large-scale commercial farming sector, accounting for 
about 113 of national cotton production in 1998. 
• The agricultural sector in Zimbabwe is more developed than in Uganda, with good 
infrastructure, a well developed agro-processing sector, and relatively high input 
usage. However, some of these services are geared towards the large-scale 
commercial sector, which has far higher productivity than the smallholder sector. 
• Uganda has a large number of cotton ginners (over 30), ranging from small 
operations with a single ginnery, to larger international companies with networks 
of modem ginneries. In Zimbabwe there are only three ginning companies, and 
the sector is dominated by the privatised Cotton Company of Zimbabwe. Given 
that Zimbabwe's production is also much higher than Uganda's, the structure of 
the ginning sector is considerably more concentrated in Zimbabwe. 
• In Zimbabwe, small-holder cotton production increased in importance throughout 
the 80s, whereas recovery has began in the mid-90s in Uganda. 
• Zimbabwe is a signficantly higher income country than Uganda, and commercial 
services are more developed in almost all sectors. 
Different approaches to input credit 
In both countries private companies have developed input credit schemes. The 
incentives to operate input credit schemes are similar in both countries: all companies 
are dependent to some extent on seed cotton from smallholders to maintain ginnery 
utilisation rates; excess capacity in the ginning sector gives companies an added 
reason to seek ways to secure access to smallholder seed cotton; and, the general 
paucity of production services for smallholders tl?reatens seed cotton production. 
The input credit schemes have evolved differently, so that for the 1998/1999 season 
the schemes in the two countries have significantly contrasting approaches. The 
universal problem with input credit schemes is defaulting farmers, especially those 
who intentionally sell to an alternative buyer to escape repayment of their loan 
(known as 'side-marketing'). 
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Uganda: 
The withdrawal of the state from the distribution of cottonseed for planting was 
recognised by ginners as seriously jeopardising seed cotton production, and therefore 
threatening the ginning sector. The initial reaction of one of the larger ginneries was 
to launch an ill-fated input credit scheme. The scheme proved disastrous as the 
majority of smallholders defaulted on their loans, due to a combination of side 
marketing and a poor harvest (on account of El Nine-related weather effects). 
Farmers disregarded the agreement they had entered into with the cotton company and 
sold to other ginners offering higher prices. The cotton company making the loans 
found it impossible to enforce the purchase agreements, and attempts to seize assets 
proved unworkable. 
In order to remove the possibility of side-marketing, the Uganda Ginners and 
Exporters Association (UGEA) has been formed, with compulsory membership of all 
cotton ginners. For the 1998/1999 season the UGEA has financed the input credit 
scheme from a Bank ofUganda loan. In developing and operating the input credit 
scheme, a critical role has been played by the Cotton Development Organisation 
(CDO), a parastatal formed when the sector was liberalised, to provide co-ordination 
and regulatory services. The CDO has coordinated the distribution of cottonseed and 
pesticides. Smallholders are free to sell their seed cotton to any ginner. The ginners 
are responsible for loan repayment, and these costs are met through a levy payable 
against volumes of cotton ginned by each ginner. (Volumes are assessed by indepent 
monitors assigned to each ginnery). Average (not individual) input costs will be 
factored into the price paid to farmers. The problem of side-marketing has therefore 
been overcome by removing the option of selling to alternative buyers: all ginners are 
members ofthe UGEA so it is impossible for a farmer taking credit to sell to buyers 
outside of the scheme. Levy avoidance by individual ginners has been reduced by the 
presence of monitors, and dialogue with border officials and spinning factories, where 
ginners may try to make illegal sales. 
Zimbabwe: 
Unlike Uganda, there has been no cooperation between the three ginning companies 
in Zimbabwe. Out of the three companies, two operate input credit schemes (the 
Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (Cottco ), and Cotpro ). Both companies have a similar 
approach for overcoming the problem of side-marketing: 
• All borrowers belong to groups of cotton smallholders. Default by one member of 
the group brings retribution to the whole group, which may be subsequently 
excluded from the scheme. This increases incentives to repay. 
• Groups performing well receive cash rewards. 
• If defaulting occurs, the companies act swiftly and come down heavily on 
defaulters, seizing assets when necessary. 
• Local agents of the cotton companies are in year-round contact with smallholders, 
building closer relationships and a sense of loyalty to the company. 
• Additional services are provided in addition to the input credit. Extension advice 
may be provided, and the Cotton Company has recently introduced cash loans. 
Again, these additional benefits of 'belonging' to a company help to strengthen 
relationships and loyalty. 
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Judging performance of input credit schemes 
Schemes in both countries are still in their infancy. In Uganda, the performance ofthe 
UGEA scheme cannot be fully judged as its first season of operation has yet to be 
completed. 
Judgement criteria Countries 
Zimbabwe Ul!anda 
Repayment Cottco: 1997/1998 season repayment First season of operation yet to be 
rate: 98% completed 
Cotpro: 1997/1998 season repayment 
rate: 100% 
Coverage For 1998/1999 season: For 1998/1999 season. 
Cottco: 48,000 smallholders Cottonseed distributed to around 
Cotpro: 5,000 smallholders 300,000 smallholder farmers, 
This represents about 25% of small- typically farming on small 
holder cotton farmers -generally unirrigated plots. The scheme is 
farming on communal or resettled intended to reach all cotton 
land ( small plots, unirrigated, and farmers (except those enrolled in a 
typically on marginal land). separate organic scheme) 
Efficient use of inputs Although no data are available, inputs Again, no data are available. 
are likely to be used efficiently. However, inputs are provided on 
• Input use is closely monitored credit, but the cost deducted 
and extension advice is provided. uniformly from farmgate prices -
• Farmers pay for inputs so have regardless ofthe volume of inputs 
good reason to use them wisely supplied to individual farmers. 
• Inputs are supplied at cost price This weakens the incentive to use 
(cheaper than local market prices inputs efficiently. Combating this, 
due to bulk buying by cotton monitoring and extension advice is 
companies and no retail margin. provided. 
Subsidies Cottco: funds for the input credit UGEA uses donor funds loaned at 
scheme have come from the World below market interest rates - and 
Bank at below market interest rates. the loan is guaranteed by the Govt. 
Cotpro: partly reliant on low interest CDO do not charge for the 
Agric Finance Corporation loans logistics support provided (Govt 
donor funds used for this) 
Contribution to cotton Small-holder credit contributes to Production credit almost certainly 
sector development increased production - but significant a critical component in cotton 
numbers of producers do not use it sector recovery 
Wider development Potential to expand financial services Whilst cotton production may 
impacts available to cotton farmers ( eg increase farmer incomes, the 
savings schemes) - with wider present input scheme does not 
development impacts contribute to wider farmer benefits 
Group approach helps build relating to eg., group capacity-
community-level capacities building and fmancial disciiJline 
Why have the schemes evolved differently? 
In Uganda the ginners decided that co-operation was needed to overcome the problem 
of side-marketing. Credit schemes implemented prior to this co-operation met with 
spectacular failure. In Zimbabwe, co-operation between the cotton companies has not 
proved essential. Instead, a set of other mechanisms has been developed for the 
successful operation of the schemes. 
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The development of the credit schemes has been affected by various factors : 
• The Cottco scheme in Zimbabwe started prior to liberalisation, when the parastatal 
(Cottco's predecessor) still operated a crop purchase monopoly. Farmers 
participated in the scheme for two years before liberalisation, and this may have 
contributed to the successful continuation of the scheme when new companies 
entered the market. (There were initial problems with default immediately after 
liberalisation, but Cottco moved quickly to tighten up procedures). 
• Financial discipline appears to be stronger in rural Zimbabwe, with farmers 
increasingly recognising the obligation to repay loans. Asset seizure in Zimbabwe 
has the desired effect of forcing people to repay, whilst in Uganda it has caused 
outrage and soured relationships between ginners and farmers. In Uganda, there 
has perhaps been more recent experience and expectation of loan amnesties, and 
weak follow-up by NGOs and state lenders (whose credit programmes ran at a 
loss). In addition, it was politically difficult to enforce loan repayment given that 
the poor harvest was largely attributable to extreme weather conditions. 
• The use of groups in Zimbabwe has been beneficial to the input credit schemes. In 
Uganda there appears to be general scepticism towards groups, possibly due to 
bad experiences in the past. The capacity to run and faciliate such groups is 
almost certainly weaker in Uganda at the present time. 
• The Zimbabwe schemes involve many incentives for good performance. Perhaps 
the greatest incentive is the opportunity to remain in the input credit schemes, 
which implies that they recognise the benefit of access to inputs. In Uganda, 
farmers rarely use fertilisers, and even pesticide use in cotton cultivation is not 
universal. They may perceive less benefit from participation in input credit 
schemes- hence the short run response of (effectively) compulsory participation 
(ie input charges are factored into seed cotton prices, regardless of participation). 
Co-operation between ginners in Uganda may be possible because of the fairly level 
playing field they face. In Zimbabwe, Cottco effectively has a head start over the 
other ginners - and stands to gain little from sharing information with the others 
(though, of course, the latecomers would benefit from the information Cottco has on 
the credit and production records of individual farmers). 
Moreover the UGEA mechanism in Uganda may be appropriate there because it is 
less demanding of skills and experience in providing services to small-holders. A 
group approach, for instance, would call for rapid learning on the part of the ginning 
companies, and co-operation with the stretched public and NGO services available in 
rural areas to facilitate and train groups. The relatively recent history of loan 
amnesties and opportunities for strategic default (intentional default, unlikely to 
jeopardise future income or access to services) would almost certainly exacerbate loan 
repayment. The UGEA mechanism could therefore be viewed as an imperfect 
pragmatic response to an immediate need to provide inputs to farmers, without which 
there would be little cotton production, and the newly rehabilitated ginneries would be 
uneconomic. 
Although co-operation can be used to combat side-marketing, it also has some 
drawbacks. Cooperation dampens incentives for the individual ginners to provide 
additional services to farmers, for instance extension advice, as farmers have no 
commitment to sell to a specific ginner. However, it may be possible for the ginners 
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to provide cotton extension services collectively- and in so doing, realise certain 
economies of scale too. However, ginners do stand to benefit from creating close 
relationships with growers, and although there is no evidence of it yet, theoretically 
ginners could compete on additional service provision as well as on price. 
Lessons from these experiences 
The input credit schemes in both countries have led to increases in cotton production. 
There has been a steady increase in smallholder seed cotton production in Zimbabwe 
during the period the schemes have been operating, whilst in Uganda estimates for 
this year's harvest are significantly higher than in recent years. Although repayment 
figures are not yet available from Uganda, the scheme has reached large numbers of 
farmers. In Zimbabwe, the Cotton Company is the largest provider of credit to 
smallholders - far larger than the parastatal Agricultural Finance Corporation. 
The success of the schemes suggests that it may be beneficial to explore potential 
applications in other countries or commodity sectors. It is useful then to summarise 
the conditions that are conducive to the development of input credit schemes in which 
repayment is linked to output marketing. 
Incentives 
Companies providing credit will recognise the risks and costs involved. These will 
vary depending on the production and market conditions pertaining to individual 
crops, and other factors relating to company presence in rural areas, the development 
of other rural services and capacities, and farmer experience of other credit schemes. 
Companies will have an incentive to provide credit if the benefits outweigh the costs. 
Examples may include situations where: 
• the trade is particularly profitable, making it worthwhile to assure supply 
sources and bear some risk (high value horticultural exports, for instance) 
• there is a need to assure supplies to maintain plant utilisation at economic 
levels (cotton ginneries, for example) 
• more assured supplies will help reduce other risks or costs faced by the 
buyer (by increasing market share, for instance) 
• farmers have no other means by which to produce the desired crop 
Farmers participating in such schemes risk indebtedness or asset seizure, and will be 
locked into sales agreements. Their willingness to participate will be partly 
dependent on: 
• a clear understanding of the potential benefits of participation 
• the desirability of securing market access 
• inability to acquire necessary inputs from other sources or by other means 
• the package of benefits on offer (for instance, inputs, transport, extension) 
• the terms on which production credit is offered (input and output prices, 
and interest rate) 
• the associated transaction costs (for instance, time spent travelling or in 
meetings, filling out forms) and skills required (eg., book-keeping) 
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Unfortunately farmers may also be willing to participate if they perceive potential for 
strategic default. The onus is on the provider to anticipate situations in which this 
might arise (for instance, where a crop can be consumed on-farm or marketed 
locally), to put the necessary mechanisms in place to avoid it (see below), and to 
make sure that farmers are aware that strategic default will not be possible. 
Means 
Companies operating input credit schemes need access to funds to finance the 
schemes. Operation of large-scale input credit schemes requires a considerable outlay 
over several months or a year (or even longer with perennial crops or livestock). 
Commercial banking sectors in both Uganda and Zimbabwe are reluctant to provide 
financing for small-holder agricultural activity (though there are some promising pilot 
projects developing more robust methodologies for lending to small-holders). In the 
cotton sectors in both countries, use has been made of international donor funds, but 
this avenue may not be available to smaller private companies (unless they co-
operate, as has happened in Uganda). Larger companies may be able to use their own 
funds. 
Mechanisms 
The experience in cotton demonstrates the variety of mechanisms that may be used to 
operate and strengthen input credit schemes which link repayment to crop purchase: 
• co-operation between buyers 
• group lending 
• close monitoring 
• extension services 
• developing good company-farmer relations 
• offering incentives for repayment 
• strict treatment of defaulters (asset seizure, legal action, group penalties) 
• lending "in-kind" to reduce diversion of inputs to other uses 
• policing potential "leakages" (crops being sold across borders for instance, 
or inputs being sold in local markets) 
The appropriate mix of mechanisms depends on the characteristics of the commodity 
sub-sector (for instance, the alternative outlets or uses for the output), the level of 
fmancial discipline of small-holders, and the presence of supporting institutions (such 
as a central co-ordinating authority, extension services, and experienced facilitators of 
farmer groups). 
Clearly applications to other sectors and country situations would require careful 
appraisal, but the experiences in the cotton sectors in Zimbabwe and Uganda provide 
some very useful pointers on enabling conditions and approaches appropriate to 
particular circumstances. 
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Strategies for the intensification of small-holder agriculture in Uganda 
by Mark Wood, Agribusiness Development Centre, Kampala 
Many fanners in Uganda do not regard farming as a business. They do not expect to 
make money from it. It is referred to as "digging". It is a low input, low output 
system, and fanners wishing to increase production tend to expand planted area rather 
than intensify. Returns to labour are low, and sometimes negative. (See Figure 1). 
The USAID funded (IDEA) project Agribusiness Development Centre, has done 
considerable work on the intensification of maize and bean production. This has 
focused on the use of improved seed, fertiliser and crop management, possibly with 
small quantities of chemicals, to increase yields and reduce costs of production. 
Figure 2 gives indicative data on the performance of two packages: improved seed 
and crop management; and improved seed, fertiliser and crop management. Figure 3 
highlights how each component of the improved package contributes to fanner 
income. With improved technology in maize production, higher yields result in a fall 
in unit production costs from 140/- to 601- per kilogram. 
In Uganda there has been much talk about the need to modernise agriculture. 
Modernisation clearly has many components - but making agriculture more 
commercial is an important part of this process. Figure 4 shows how improvements 
in technology transfer, input supply and output marketing can increase fanner 
incomes, and help small-holders make the shift into commercial farming. IDEA 
works with the extension services and NGOs to expose fanners to these technologies-
using small demonstration plots (to compare traditional and improved systems), field 
days and fanner site supervision to reach approximately 120,000 fanners per annum. 
(See Figure 5). IDEA has not focused on the use of credit to achieve these changes -
instead it has encouraged fanners to draw on their own resources, and to make these 
investments a high priority. IDEA stresses the business management aspects of 
fanning. 
Rural areas are poorly served by farm input networks and fanners usually lack 
information on purchased inputs. An additional focus for IDEA has therefore been to 
try to bring inputs physically within reach of fanners, by providing support to the 
input supply chain: wholesaler importers, district distributors and village stockists. 
The support provided under ATAIN (Agent Training and Input Network) comprises: 
• mediation between the parties concerned 
• a loan guarantee (on which there has been no call so far) 
• training (product knowledge, safe use and handling, marketing, record-
keeping and business management). 
AT AIN facilitates trade between five regional distributors and village stockists, by 
guaranteeing small loans (made in the form of inputs advanced) to the stockists by the 
distributors (See Figure 6). There has been no call on this guarantee so far, and 
stockists are not aware that the guarantee exists. There are roughly 180 stockists 
participating in the scheme - and all have benefited from the guarantee. 
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The stockists also provide critical extension on the products - and the product training 
provided to the stockists has proved to be one of the most popular components of the 
project. Just as stockists are able to be extensionists, some government extension 
agents have become stockists as well. If these distribution systems can be sustained, 
the challenge will be to maintain objectivity in the advice provided by stockists. 
Should stockists choose to advance inputs to their customers, without first receiving 
full payment, ATAIN has no role in this transaction. (Certainly such arrangements 
occur- and village-level stockists are well-placed to assess the default risk before 
entering into such informal agreements). Figure 7 gives indicative data on stockist 
margins. An estimated 30-40,000 farmers have benefited from improved access to 
inputs. 
Despite these achievements, and the fact that AT AIN is operational in one of the most 
agriculturally progressive parts ofUganda (Mbale and Kapchorwa), small-holder 
demand for inputs is still very low (around 500 tonnes of fertiliser/season). 
ID EA is also working on output marketing to enhance farmer confidence that his or 
her harvest will be sold at a fair price. Figure 8 outlines the nature of the marketing 
support provided. 
The success of these pilot schemes illustrates the potential for "modernisation" of 
small-holder agriculture in Uganda- and underlines the importance of co-ordinated 
action on technology transfer, input supply and output marketing. 
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Figure 7 
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The production and marketing of agricultural seeds in Uganda 
by Fred Muhhuku, Marketing Manager, Uganda Seed Project 
INTRODUCTION 
There are about 2.5 million farm families in Uganda who must use seed from one 
source or another. The vast majority of them are small-scale fanners. Uganda has 
favourable agro-ecological conditions which permit the cultivation of a diverse range 
of crops. In theory, this offers enormous opportunities for seed companies. In 
practice, however, the use of improved seeds has eluded the majority of fanners. For 
example, it is estimated that the annual seed requirement for maize is about 10,000 
tonnes, while for beans it is about 90,000 tonnes. However, seed supplied from the 
formal seed sector is only about 1,500 tonnes and 1,000 tonnes respectively! The 
situation is the same for all the crops. What then is the problem? 
USE OF IMPROVED SEEDS 
Seed is the most critical agricultural input. Fanners are well aware of this and have 
always used seeds since the advent of crop fanning. They are capable of producing 
their own seed, or getting it from neighbours or some other local source. They seldom 
go out to buy seeds except in the event of some unfavourable weather conditions 
leading to crop failure, or a prolonged dry spell. Only large-scale, commercial fanners 
tend to deliberately look for and buy seeds. 
The use of improved seeds (coupled with better management practices) would greatly 
increase fann productivity by smallholders. However, for farmers to buy seeds and 
keep on buying them, such seeds must have characteristics that are consistently 
superior to those seeds the farmer has always had. These include the following: 
• The seeds must be "technically" effective, 
• They must be of dependable and reliable quality, 
• They must be locally available just when the farmers need them, 
• The price must be "reasonable", and 
• The seeds must be conveniently packaged. 
Technical effectiveness 
Improved seeds must not only be regarded as better than the existing fanner-saved 
seeds, but they must be proved to be better by the fanner himself. Quite often 
recommendations are based on results obtained at the Research Stations and 
performance standards are biased towards broad adaptation rather than local 
adaptation and suitability for resource-poor smallholders. In fact local conditions on 
the fann, including cultural practices and micro-ecological conditions, may so differ 
that the "improved" seed actually performs worse than the existing cultivars 
commonly used. Sometimes the new variety may be too demanding for the farmer in 
terms of say, labour, need for fertilisers or chemical sprays, etc. Should the farmer fail 
to fulfil these demands the variety flops. In such a case, the fanner will not buy the 
variety again. 
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It is also known that the demand for industry supplied seed of self pollinated crops 
such as beans, or open-pollinated crops like non-hybrid maize is only sufficient for 
periodic replacement of cultivars, usually less than 10% of total needs (ADC/IDEA 
Project, 1996). Yet these are the varieties currently produced by USP. Only recently 
have we started producing hybrid maize seed. In the case of beans, the informal seed 
distribution network is obviously the most important channel in Uganda. Moreover, 
studies have shown that the quality of seed obtained in this way is of acceptable 
standards and offers no economic disincentive to the farmers (ADC/IDEA Project, 
1996). This system is also capable of supplying the many types of bean cultivars 
usually demanded by Ugandan small farmers. 
Quality dependability and reliability 
The quality of seed cannot generally be identified by sight, smell or touch. The 
earliest a farmer can judge the quality is often at crop maturity or harvest. If the 
variety does not live up to expectations a lot of damage will have been done. This will 
require tremendous effort to undo so the farmer can buy the seed again. 
The issue of seed quality in Uganda certainly leaves a lot to be desired. Many 
varieties are very old (for example, groundnuts: Red Beauty (1966), beans: K20 
(1972)). Genetic quality is difficult to guarantee in such cases, unless there is a 
deliberate, rigorous maintenance breeding scheme. Physical and physiological quality 
have also not always been assured mostly because of the grossly inefficient state run 
seed schemes. Other contributory factors are: inefficient input delivery systems, poor 
infrastructure, the hot, humid climate, and low levels of literacy among farmers. 
Price relationships 
The farmer normally takes into account the relationship between the price of the seed 
and that of the produce. The actual price of the seed itself and the physical production 
from the variety are not enough to convince the farmer if he perceives the price ofhis 
produce to be low. 
In Uganda the prices of agricultural produce are regarded as low, although they are 
probably among the highest in the World! This results from poor production 
techniques which lead to very low yields. The prices also fluctuate wildly. Increased 
aggregate production of a particular crop actually leads to a fall in the price of that 
commodity. This tends to adversely affect the ability and willingness of farmers to 
buy improved seed. Pioneer (1990, p4) states that " .... sales and profits from non-
hybrid seed are heavily dependent on commodity prices ..... and are subject to year-to-
year fluctuations". 
The actual price of seed for a particular crop is itself a function of its multiplication 
factor. This is the ratio of seed yield over seed planted (yield per acre/seed rate). Thus 
a crop with a low multiplication factor or a high seed rate will inevitably have a high 
seed price and will be too expensive for farmers. Unless the product has a high market 
value, the farmers will not buy the seed. This is the case with groundnut and bean 
seeds. 
Timeliness of seed delivery 
Demand for seed is highly seasonal, and if the farmer cannot get the seed on time he 
risks losing the season. Attempts to hold carry-over stocks [by the farmer, or the seed 
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trader, or even USP] are beset by quality problems! With rudimentary seed 
processing equipment, and a poorly developed seed distribution network it is not 
possible to avail seeds to the farming community in time for each season. The result is 
that farmers will find alternative sources of seed. 
Although seed production and processing should be driven by market demand, no 
effort has been made to make an assessment of the actual demand for various seeds in 
this country. Regular market surveys are crucial for production planning and would 
enhance timely delivery of the right seeds, and in the right quantities. In fact many 
times USP finds itself with surplus seed stocks which it disposes of as grain at low 
prices leading to big financial losses. 
The Uganda Seed Project is unable to quickly respond to market changes, and to 
supply the full range of seeds needed. Farmers have a vast range of crops to choose 
from and many do grow a bit of each. This makes it nearly impossible for the USP to 
provide the full range of seeds, some of which are required in uneconomical 
quantities. 
Seed, like other agro-inputs, is adversely affected by the existing inefficient and 
fragmented input delivery systems. Coordination and integration of input and output 
marketing systems would result in economies of operation and improved customer 
service. Uganda has liberalised the marketing systems but the private sector has yet to 
live up to the challenge. Issues of dishonesty, sale of fake products, overcharging, 
poor customer relations, etc still abound. At the same time, control and regulatory 
mechanisms hardly exist. 
Seed packages 
The size of the seed package offered for sale influences the ability and willingness of 
farmers to buy the seeds. USP has traditionally packed seeds in 25 & 10 Kg packets 
which are obviously too big for smallholder farmers. An attempt has been made to 
address this and now we offer 5 & 2 Kg packets, but not without problems. There is 
no local production of these packaging materials, and USP does not have appropriate 
machinery to pack the seeds. All the 2Kg, and some of the 5Kg, packs are packed by 
hand. Yet we realise that it would even be better to have 1Kg & 1/2Kg packets in 
order to meet the requirements of the majority of our farmers. 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The process of developing improved seeds, producing/processing them, and making 
them available to farmers is handled by various institutions, including NARO, USP, 
and the Extension Service of MAAIF. Though such an arrangement could have the 
advantage of specialisation (W. Ntege-Nanyeenya, et al, 1997), in practice, 
fragmentation and lack of coordination have had negative effects on farmers' 
willingness to use improved seeds. Each institution has had its share of problems, all 
of which have affected the farmers' willingness to purchase improved seeds. 
An effective extension service enhances procurement of seeds by farmers through 
provision of technical guidance, and provides feedback to the other institutions on the 
performance of the seeds under farmers' conditions. This feedback guides NARO in 
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developing more acceptable varieties. At present, however, the extension service is in 
a coma! 
TECHNOLOGY PACKAGES 
Improved seeds, by their nature, have to be accompanied by other "technologies" if 
their potential is to be realised. These include: better agronomic practices, use of 
fertilisers, better control of pests and diseases, etc. Farmers need to be made aware of 
these requirements and to have easy access to them. Smallholder farmers do not often 
get information about them, nor do they have access to them. They may also not 
afford them. This greatly affects their willingness to buy improved seeds. There is a 
need to develop low-input technologies for smallholder farmers. 
THE POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED USE OF IMPROVED SEEDS 
The potential for increased usage of improved seed appears to be quite good, 
especially for maize (both OPs & hybrids), hybrid sorghums and sunflower, and for 
groundnuts. The potential also exists for Upland Rice although it is a relatively new 
crop. It also appears that the private sector could play an important role in the 
production and distribution of maize seed (ADC/IDEA Project, 1996). To exploit this 
potential, a number of issues need to be addressed. 
Increased farmer awareness 
This appears to be the most fundamental intervention to increase the demand for 
improved seeds generally. Demonstrations by IDEA Project, SG2000, and other 
NGOs have shown very encouraging results. Studies have shown that different 
members of the family play different roles in the production process, so there is a 
need to target extension messages to reach those responsible for each aspect 
(ADC/IDEA Project, 1996). Another important avenue for increasing farmers' 
awareness ofthe benefits ofusing improved seed is the use of Radio programmes. 
The USP has actively participated in the demonstration activities of IDEA Project, 
SG2000, and other NGOs. It has also encouraged DECs and Agents to set up demos 
whenever possible, especially during agricultural shows and mobilisation seminars. 
Radio programmes have also been aired in various local languages. Posters and 
pamphlets have been extensively distributed. 
Better varieties 
For selfing crops, groundnuts and upland rice have the potential for increased usage. 
In the case of groundnuts, the existing variety is old, low yielding and susceptible to 
rosette virus: And yet groundnuts is a fairly commercial crop with a sizeable internal 
market. A good variety could be marketable even to smallholder farmers. Upland rice 
is a new crop in Uganda with a good steady market. USP has not been able to supply 
sufficient quantities of seeds of the existing varieties. 
Though beans have become fairly commercialised in Uganda, it is unrealistic to 
expect high demand for seeds from the formal seed sector. The emphasis should be on 
the introduction of new varieties with export potential and improved resistance to 
diseases. 
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The potential for using hybrid seed even by small scale farmers is known ( eg. 
Zimbabwe). The case for hybrid maize seed is well established. In Uganda the 
potential also exists for sorghum and sunflower hybrids. Sorghum is an important 
food crop with a regional market, and a better yielding hybrid is likely to be taken up 
even by smallholders. Sunflower is an industrial crop with great demand, but the 
current variety New Sunfola is a disappointingly low yielder. A high yielding hybrid 
could attract demand. 
Input supply 
As earlier stated, maximum benefit can only be obtained from improved seeds if the 
necessary inputs are used. The cost and ease of availability of these other inputs is of 
crucial importance in stimulating demand for improved seeds. The demos referred to 
earlier also included these inputs and farmers showed alot of interest. Extension work 
should cover whole packages rather than seeds alone. 
Government has already pulled out of supplying agro-inputs and left it to the private 
sector. The latter needs to actively engage in promoting and demonstrating the 
importance of these technologies. The war against fake products has to be jointly 
fought by both the private sector itself and the government regulatory services. 
Policy and Institutional changes 
Uganda is also promoting the private sector in the seed industry. The industry has 
been fully liberalised and several companies have been licensed to deal in seeds. The 
sole state seed scheme, the USP, is to be fully divested. This means that the activities 
of production, processing and marketing are to privatised. It also means that the 
regulatory functions are to be consolidated into an autonomous (or semi-autonomous) 
body called the National Seed Certification Services (NSCS). These are all provided 
for in the Agricultural Seed and Plant Statute, 1994. But even as the formal process of 
privatisation drags on, most of the seed production and marketing are now in the 
hands of private individuals and companies. Already a nascent network of private 
seed traders set up in 1995 has greatly increased seed sales albeit occasionally being 
let down by production constraints. 
The private sector is expected to play a leading role in hybrid seeds and horticultural 
seeds, and generally to enhance the use of improved seeds by farmers through more 
efficient production and marketing mechanisms. Liberalisation may also lead to 
development of smaller, more specialised companies catering for particular crops or 
regions. However, private seed firms are not expected to engage in seed production 
and marketing for selfing crops, such as beans, on a large scale due to absence of 
sufficient financial incentives. Government should continue to promote informal, 
non-market methods of seed production and distribution for these crops, although the 
private sector could still boost the system by forming strong producer/buyer linkages. 
There is still a need to update and streamline the said Seed Statute and to put in place 
clear policies to guide the seed industry. Formal establishment of the National Seed 
Industry Authority (NSIA) would create a body responsible for evolving such 
policies. Suitable policies should identify the roles of the public and private sectors in 
order to cater for interests of the majority of farmers. 
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Improved seed certification and control 
A strong and motivated certification service is necessary to ensure seed quality at the 
point of sale which would boost the farmers' confidence in buying improved seeds. 
However, seed certification standards need to be adjusted/eased in order to service 
informal, local-level seed production by NGOs and farmers' groups. In Zambia, the 
Seed Certification and Control Institute has a department responsible for the informal 
seed sector. 
As stated above, the NSCS has been established by law in Uganda. Unfortunately the 
body has yet to be actually set up. It seems that in the process of downsizing the 
Public Service, seed certification was regarded as an unnecessary burden and the 
NSCS was dropped from the Ministry structure. This is of course unfortunate and it is 
hoped the error will be rectified. 
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Constraints to agricultural technology and input use in Uganda: NARO's 
contribution, strategies and opportunities to enhance adoption. 
by William N anyeenya, socio-economist, Monitoring and Evaluation Planning 
Unit, NARO Secretariat, and Peter Ngategize, Programme Leader- socio-
economics, and director, COREC 
BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
The population ofUganda is estimated to be 20 million (1995) with an annual growth 
rate of2.6 per cent The country has a total area of241 038 square kilometers of 
which 197 097 and 43 942 square kilometers is land area, and water and swamps, 
respectively. A large proportion ofland, over 75 per cent of the country, making up 
about 18 million hectares is available for cultivation, pasture or both. About 4.6 
million hectares (42 per cent) ofthe potentially arable land is currently farmed. In 
Uganda agriculture is almost entirely rainfed with only 3 000 ha (0.07 per cent) of 
cultivated land being irrigated. The proportion of irrigated land is very small 
compared to an estimated 41 0 000 ha of land that need irrigation in Uganda. 
Agricultural production in Uganda is characterised by smallholders operating low 
input low risk crop-livestock intergrated systems. The average farm size is 2.5 to 3.0 
hectares. There are an estimated 2.5 million smallholdings. 
The Roles and Functions ofMAAIF in Agricultural Technology Development 
and Transfer (TDT) 
The Ministry of agriculture animal industry and fisheries (MAAIF) is mandated to 
play a central role in the delivery of the national economic development mission 
which currently targets eradication of poverty and modernisation of agriculture. In 
order to address this national objective, the MAAIF mandate is geared towards 
attaining the following agricultural sector objectives: 
• Ensure the supply of adequate and balanced food in all parts of the country and at 
all times 
• Ensure the supply of raw materials to meet the needs of local agro-industries 
• Stimulate production for import substitution 
• Diversify production for export 
• Improve rural incomes and quality of life , and 
• Conserve soil, water, forest and other resources for improving and sustaining 
agricultural productivity. 
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The Roles and Functions of NARO in Agricultural Technology Development and 
Transfer (TDT) 
The National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) is a semi-autonomous 
organisation under MAAIF established by an act of parliament of 1992. The objects 
ofNARO are: 
• To streamline, coordinate, conduct and promote mainly adaptive and applied 
research in livestock, fisheries, forestry, crops, mechanisation and appropriate 
technology, and food science. 
• To ensure dissemination and application of research results 
In light of the agricultural modernisation objective, NARO is geared to place more 
emphasis on the dissemination function. To this effect, NARO will backstop District 
decentralised agricultural extension services by providing technical guidance, 
capacity building, training and financial support to district and sub-county 
programmes in the field. In order to establish effective linkage with the field some 
District Farming Institutes (DFIS), selected from each agro-ecological zone in 
Uganda are being transformed into Zonal Adaptive Research and Outreach centres 
(ZAROCS). In addition zonal outreach centres (ZOCS) will be established for: 
• Conducting adaptive and demonstration trials, 
• Production of seed, planting materials, livestock breeds and fish fry, and 
• Multi media communication and skills improvement to extension staff and farmers. 
The National Agricultural Research Organisation currently has nine research 
institutes/centres namely: 
Forestry Research Institute (FORI) 
Fisheries Research Institute (FIRI) 
Coffee Research Centre (COREC) 
Agricultural Engineering and Appropriate Technology Research Institute 
(AEATRI) 
Kawanda Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) 
Livestock Health Research Institute (LIRI) 
Food Science and Technology Research Institute (FOSRI) 
Serere Agricultural and Animal Production Research Institute (SAARI), and 
Namulonge Agricultural and Animal Production Research Institute (NAARI). 
For purposes of this presentation, agricultural technology and inputs are broadly 
defined to include: crop varieties, livestock breeds and feed ingredients, fish fry types, 
chemical inputs (pesticides, fertilisers, fungicides, drugs and vaccines inter alia), farm 
tools, equipment, implements, and farm machinery, and water for production. 
The agricultural TDT spectrum is composed of the various stages from the time of 
technology generation at the research institutes, to application of the research results 
into practical working forms by the targeted clients. Technology generation is a 
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process where research outputs are produced using local developed "home grown" 
materials or those adapted from similar environments hence requiring less elaborate 
adjustment or refinement to suit local requirements. Technology development entails 
bulking, multiplication and distribution of the technology in question, varieties, stock 
or prototypes of limited quantities and of particular standards/attributes specified by 
the researchers, to structure them appropriately for the end-users. 
Technology dissemination refers to access to technology by the ultimate beneficiaries 
through a range of technology uptake pathways including: NARO's direct link to 
beneficiaries through adaptive and demonstration trials, MAAIF, NGOs and CBOs, 
religious organisations and the private sector. The functioning of channels through 
which the users access the improved agricultural technologies is affected by physical 
infrastracture, input and output market conditions, and policy and support systems 
like credit. This process ensures that there is a continuous supply of technology to the 
users in the form, place and time acceptable, accessible and relevant to the 
requirements of the users, and meeting the stipulated attributes. 
In Uganda, agricultural TDT is more operationalised and developed in the crops sub-
sector. This TDT is structured as a seed programme which includes plant breeding, 
variety release, seed production, seed processing, seed certification, seed marketing 
and extension. In order to have the functions of these components successfully 
implemented they must be interlinked. Plant breeding work is done by NARO whose 
new varieties are released by a Variety Release Committee (VRC). The VRC is 
composed of relevant directors in NARO and MAAIF, representatives from seed 
dealers, Ministry of Trade and Industry and Produce Marketing Agencies. 
Seed production, processing, certification and marketing is carried out by Uganda 
Seed Project (USP) ofMAAIF. The USP deals in seed ofbeans, maize, sesame, 
sunflower, groundnuts, soyabeans, finger millet, sorghum and upland rice. Breeder's 
seed is obtained from crop-based institutes (KARI, NAARI, and SAARI) following 
presentation of attributes of the new varieties to VRC based on on-farm trial results. 
The seed is then moved through stages of foundation, registration and certification by 
USP. The USP has seed multiplication and processing capacity at Kasese, Masindi 
and Kisindi which is supplemented by seed outgrower schemes. The agriculture seeds 
and plant statute of 1994 provides for registration of seed producers, importers, and 
exporters and establishment of a National Seed Certification Service (NSCS) as an 
independent regulatory body. 
UGANDA'S CURRENT STATUS OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND INPUT 
USE: A CHALLENGE TO MODERNISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND 
POVERTY ERADICATION 
There are direct and implicit indicators of low technology and input usage in Uganda. 
These indicators are manifested through national aggregate production, area and yield 
figures and household or farm level performance indices. 
On an aggregate scale, the current "capacity utilization" of 42 percent ofUganda's 
arable land against national demand for food and raw materials for agro-industry and 
export market is an indication of inefficient farm power input development in terms of 
tools, implements and farm machinery. Uganda's farm power utilization structure is a 
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manifestation of primary and secondary tillage, and a crop husbandry system 
dominated by human muscle as the main source of power using largely simple hand 
tools. For instance: 93 percent ofhouseholds use hand hoes; 87 percent use pangas 
(machetes); 5 percent use ox-ploughs; and 2 percent tractors (see Table 1). For most 
crops in Uganda it has been observed that farmers' yields are in most cases less than a 
third of their potential (see Table 2). This is a result of a set of complex causes, 
principal among them being the dominant use of local varieties and heavy dependency 
on preserved seed from previous harvests. The contribution of certified seed (see 
Table 3) from Uganda Seed Project to Uganda's seed requirements ranges from 0.1 
per cent to 2.7 per cent for sesame and maize, respectively. 
Table 1: Status of Household input Use in Uganda, October 1993 
Input Type 
Improved Maize Seed 
Improved Bean Seed 
Hoes (round eye) 
Wheel Barrows 
Tractors 
Ox-Ploughs 
Knapsack spray pumps 
Pangas (machetes) 
Milking Cans 
Watering cans 
Pruning knives 
Source: NCAL, 1993 
Households Reported(%) 
27.0 
44.0 
93.0 
5.0 
2.0 
5.0 
5.0 
87.0 
2.0 
1.0 
24.0 
Table 2: Comparison of Potential and Realised Farm Yields for Common Crops 
in Uganda, 1993 
Crop 
Maize 
Beans 
Finger Millet 
Cassava 
Sweet Potatoes 
Irish potatoes 
Matooke 
Farm yields Research yields Yield gap(%) 
1.8 
1.0 
1.6 
9.0 
4.0 
7.0 
6.0 
(Metric tons per hectare) 
8.0 
3.0 
5.0 
50.0 
30.0 
35.0 
35.0 
66 
77 
68 
82 
87 
80 
83 
Source: Adapted from Tukacungurwa, 1994. 
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Table 3: The Contribution of USP to Uganda's National Seed Requirements, 
1996 
Crop Seed requirements USP Seed supply USP's contribution(%) 
Maize 
Beans 
Finger Millet 
Groundnuts 
Sorghum 
Sesame 
14 600 
30 750 
1600 
15 600 
2710 
1720 
(Metric tons) 
396 
116 
16 
101 
57 
1 
2.7 
0.4 
1.0 
0.7 
2.1 
0.1 
Source: Compiled from Uganda Seed Project Commercial variety list, 1996; Production statistics from 
Statistics Department, MAAIF and Sales records, USP. 
Adoption of Longe 1 the improved maize varieties was estimated to be about 40 and 
44 percent by Ntege-Nanyeenya et a/1997, and NCAL 1993, respectively. Crop 
technologies are released in the form of a production technology package comprising 
planting architecture, population, disease and pest control, soil moisture and nutrient 
requirements. 
In most cases crop management components of the package like spacing, thinning, 
weeding frequency and harvesting that do not involve use of purchased inputs are 
adopted by farmers (Ntege Nanyeenya et al., 1997). Results from NCAL 1993 
indicate availability of knapsack spray pumps to households at 5 percent. This 
suggests that chemicals administered by pumps would not be adopted widely either. 
With regard to water requirements, the irrigated area of0.07 percent 
( N anyeenya and Odogola, 1998) of total cultivated area confers a critical constraint 
to crop development which compounds the already existing low plant nutrient regime 
into an acute production constraint. 
Although there has always been a general beliefthat Uganda is endowed with fertile 
soils, continous cropping and poor soil conservation measures have caused depletion 
of some important nutrients. This notwithstanding Ugandan consumption of fertilisers 
of0.1 kilograms per hectare (Tukacungurwa 1994) is reported to be the lowest in the 
world. 
CONSTRAINTS AND SHORTFALL IN TECHNOLOGY AND INPUT USE 
A number of studies have been conducted to assess technology uptake constraints 
(Tukachungurwa 1994; NARO 1995; Ntege-Nanyeenya et al1997; Nanyeenya and 
Kisauzi 1998; and NARO 1998b ). The technology needs identified were classified 
as: hardware and physical fixed inputs; variable inputs consumed during the course 
production; information and technical skills; and needs relating to policy, socio-
economic and agro-ecological constraints. 
Hardware and Fixed Asset Needs 
For the hardware and materials category the following were observed: insufficient 
farm power implements for land opening, planting, weeding, harvesting and transport 
(increasing drudgery to farm operators); lack of energy conservation equipment for 
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cooking, and post-harvest crop processing; and lack of exclusion technology like 
fences. 
Living Capital (Biological Infrastructure) and Variable Input Needs. 
The following were identified as priority needs under living capital and variable 
inputs category: lack of improved seed, planting materials, fish fry and livestock 
breeds; lack of quality feeds for poultry and fish; lack of agro- chemicals and artificial 
insemination services. 
Information and Technical Skills 
Key issues in this category are: inappropriate soil and water management; lack of 
veterinary diagnostic services to confirm/establish livestock diseases; and insufficient 
skills in crop and livestock husbandry. 
Policy, Socio-economic and Agro-ecology Constraints 
In the area of policy, socio-economic and agro-ecological constraints the following 
were cited: 
• Weak support systems and poor marketing arrangements to counter wide seasonal 
price changes, and absence of reliable farm credit mechanisms curtails input 
distribution and technology adoption. 
• Lack of a regular fertility programme, and existence of climate and soil conditions 
with which some harvests are realised even without using modem technology 
leads to stagnant soil nutrient status. Nevertheless, heavy rains that are sometimes 
received lead to leaching and soil erosion. 
• Participation of Government through projects and NGOs in input marketing at 
subsidised rates to fmal consumers makes input trade less attractive to private 
operators who must recover costs and earn profits. Farmers affected by "relief 
dependency syndrome" and private traders keep out because of the disincentives 
and distortions created in the market. 
• Lack of input standards for Uganda in the case of implements and tools, and 
regulatory mechanisms for the distribution channels of all agro-inputs .has led to 
abuse of the liberation policy that allows importation and domestic marketing of 
inputs by the private sector. This has led to adulteration and/or sale of fake seed, 
acaricides and pesticides. The danger of this practice is that on realising that such 
technology does not meet their expectations, farmers subsequently disadopt them. 
• The dominance of subsistence production is in itself a disincentive for the use of 
purchased inputs and modem technology. Besides, the misconception that rural 
farmers are poor and cannot therefore afford purchased inputs, makes policy 
makers and scientists evolve least -cost though not necessarily most optimal 
recommendations for most technical interventions. This does not take into 
consideration credit arrangements, benefit-cost relationships and group 
procurement alternatives. The opportunities for commercialisation are hence 
hampered. 
• "Protection of the environment syndrome" promotes prohibitive or restricted use 
of chemicals and efficient farm machinery without bearing in mind the critical 
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application levels which are very far from the almost zero application which 
currently apply in Uganda. Environmental protection bias has led to many 
diagnostic studies proposing breeding for tolerant varieties to pests, diseases, 
drought and use of biorationals and ethnoveterinary products at the expense of 
other supporting elements of integrated crop and livestock management. 
• Low priority randking of agriculture within district budgets. This is manifested by 
the financial allocations to extension programmes and facilitation provided to the 
extension workers. 
• In most diagnostic and research intervention programmes on technology adoption 
and input use, the contribution of support systems in agricultural TDT is often 
accorded low recognition and hence subsequently marginalised in the corrective 
structures. Streamlining of agricultural TDT puts uneven reliance on research-
extension-farmer linkages at the expense of support systems like input 
distribution, standards and regulations, and credit schemes. In most cases, this 
linkage concentrates on material and hardware forms of technology and leaves 
behind the consumables, information and skills required for the former to attain 
their genetic and engineering potentials. 
• Absence of information on marginal rate of return (to supplement varieties 
released) especially on fertiliser use, results in recommendations based on 
technical rather than economic efficiency. Besides being wasteful such 
recommendations are often not profitable. 
• In some areas of South-west, Western and Central Uganda cultural hinderances 
and lack of promotional policy for draught animal power (DAP) technology 
hampers its wider adoption. 
MEASURES AND ATTEMPTS BY NARO TO IMPROVE TECHNOLOGY AND 
INPUT UPTAKE 
Low adoption and input use has been a concern ofNARO. In 1995, Action Research 
and Development Programmes (ARDP) were implemented to foster dissemination 
through training, demonstrations and publications, and production of basic planting 
materials for primary seed producers. The commodities covered by ARDP were 
cassava, groundnuts, beans, multipurpose tree species, sweet potatoes, Irish potato, 
smallholder dairy, sesame, fish (aquaculture), and forest products. In addition, the 
programme delivered services in tsetse control and packaging of fishing gear. 
NARO conducted a technology assessment survey in 1995 to establish technology 
needs and intervention options for food crops, namely bananas, cassava, finger millet 
and beans as part of an FAO sponsored strategy for sustainable agricultural 
production and food security in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In 1998, NARO participated in the National Programme for Planting and stocking 
materials seed establishment and multiplication, ofMAAIF. This project covers 
coffee, and high value horticultural crops, fish fry, sericulture, elite herds and nucleus 
breeding scheme, and national bull stud. The aim of the study was to increase 
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propagation of highly productive plants and animals, and increase awareness, 
production knowledge and skills to producers. 
An assessment of factors affecting maize production technology adoption (Ntege-
Nanyeenya et al1997) revealed that credit utilization was very low (17 percent), and 
herbicide and fertilizer adoption as well as draught animals were nearly nil. It was 
also reported that farmers' groups, literacy, use of hired labour (farm power 
availability) and rented land tenure (profit-oriented production) significantly affected 
farmers' decision to adopt. A follow-up stakeholders workshop (Nanyeenya and 
Kisauzi 1998) which comprised farmers, local administrators, chiefs and policy 
makers, NGOs and government extension staff, to validate findings, and evolve action 
plans to implement the recommendations, endorsed by the stakeholders, came up with 
the following. 
• Training and demonstration of herbicide and animal draught power utilization 
were proposed to address critical labour demands 
• Taking advantage of SG2000-IDEA-SUKURA maize and bean seed, and 
diammonium phosphate and urea fertiliser repackaging, was identified as a focal 
area to spur adoption of production packages. SG 2000 is an international NGO 
working in thirteen districts in Uganda, linked to input importers like MAGRIC 
and packaging agents (Balton) 
• Benefit -cost considerations as additional criteria for variety release 
• Provision of simple field soil testing kits to district field staff, and availing of soil 
amendment recommendations on a more location specific terms (rather than 
blanket regional recommendations) 
STRATEGIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACCELERATION 
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND INPUT USE IN UGANDA: 
RECOMl\1ENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
NARO's focus in TDT, experiences of technology dissemination by government and 
non-government agencies, and farmers' endowments and circumstances suggest that 
the following strategies could be exploited: 
1. In order to ensure adoption of production technology as a package ZAROCS 
and ZOCS should be used to demonstrate technology package vis-a-vis stepwise 
adoption and traditional practices by farmers. This will augment NARO's efforts to 
strengthen technology dissemination to the relevant uptake pathways in the field. 
2. Standards for agricultural implements and tools and enforcement of 
regulations for agricultural inputs should be put in place to avoid use of fake inputs. 
Despite the existence of the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS), in reality 
standards and regulations are put in place upon request by the line ministry concerned. 
3. The role of the private sector in input distribution should be encouraged to 
increase their outreach in rural areas (as opposed to government and development 
agencies which subsidize the input distribution on an unsustainable basis and even 
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cause a disincentive to the private operators). In order to have long-run benefits and 
success, market forces should guide the input business. Output market constraints 
such as storage and market information should be addressed. This will also 
establish/strengthen the research-extension-farmer- market linkage. Input demand is 
derived demand that is explicitly affected by output demand. 
4. Studies on critical application levels and marginal rates of returns (MRR) 
should be incorporated in the variety release criteria. 
5. The potential for integrating credit information into input delivery systems 
should be studied and viable options promoted taking examples from IDEA project, 
Sasakawa Global 2000 and Soroti District Development Programme (SDDP) 
oxenization credit schemes. 
6. District decentralized budgets should provide fmancial backing to extension 
and agricultural development activities. Secretaries for production and environment 
should work closely with extension and input dealers to demonstrate technology and 
input attributes and benefits. 
7. The option of supplementing rainfed agriculture with appropriate irrigation 
systems should be explored. The experience of smallholder irrigation projects, and 
farm level applied research methods in eastern and southern Africa (F ARMESA) 
could be utilised. 
8. The use of inorganic or chemical inputs does not preclude the use of organic 
ones. Within crop-livestock integrated systems the synergistic benefits should be 
explored to enhance soil fertility by use of livestock manure. Manures improve the 
soil structure and even make inorganic fertilisers work better. Bio-rationals and 
ethnoveterinary concepts should be studied so as to rationalise their advantages. 
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Private input suppliers working with the communal sector in Zimbabwe 
by Tonneth Gazi, Sales Manager, Agricura, Zimbabwe 
Introduction 
Agriculture dominates the Zimbabwean economy despite the fact that its contribution 
to the Gross Domestic Produce (GDP) is less than 20% (15% in 1997). Almost 75% 
of the population (12 million) depends on agriculture as a source of income. It 
accounted for between 40% to 46% of the export earnings between 1995 and 1997. 
In Zimbabwe, the natural growing season is generally confined to the rainy months. 
The season lasts from mid-October to April. It is critical for farmers to acquire their 
agricultural inputs before the season starts. 
Zimbabwe's farming sectors 
The agriculture sector in Zimbabwe is divided into three distinct sub-sectors: large-
scale commercial farms; communal farming areas (including resettlement areas); and 
small -scale commercial farms. 
1. Large Scale Commercial Farms are located mainly in natural regions I, II and 
Ill, where there are about 5,100 farmers on 11 million hectares on the land. 
Farmer numbers have been falling because of the land redistribution 
programme. 
2. Communal Farms occupy about 18 million hectares, mainly in natural regions 
IV and V. There are about 1 million households on 16 million hectares. 
3. There are about 52,000 households on 3.3 million hectares of resettlement 
land. With the second phase of resettlement, more households are expected to 
be resettled on the land being acquired by the Government. The Government 
buys land from Large Scale Commercial farming areas, and resettles farmers 
from communal areas. 
4. There are about 9,000 Small Scale Commercial farmers on 1.2 million 
hectares. 
Historically the Large Scale Commercial farms were reserved for whites while 
Communal Lands and Small Scale Commercial farms were for blacks. The 
resettlement areas were introduced after independence in 1980 to redistribute land. 
Before independence, agricultural policies were focused more on Large Scale 
Commercial farms, which were fewer. After independence, the thrust one of 
affirmative action for Communal Farmers by supporting them and resettling them in 
high potential zones. 
Crop production 
Zimbabwe produces a variety of crops in its different sectors and zones. In terms of 
value (market share) the three main crops, in order of importance, are tobacco, cotton, 
and maize. In terms of strategic importance, maize comes first as it is the staple food. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the importance of selected crops to the different farming sectors. 
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Table 1: Market share of different farming sectors for major crops (1997) 
Sector 
Crop L.S.C.F S.S.C.F Communal Resettlement Total 
Maize 28% 3% 57% 12% 100% 
Cotton 22% 3% 67% 8% 100% 
Tobacco 96% - 1% 3% 100% 
Groundnuts 2% 6% 83% 9% 100% 
Coffee 100% - - - 100% 
Soya Beans I 98% - 2% - 100% 
Table 2: 1998/99 Cropping season forecasts in communal areas 
Crop Area (ha) Yield jtlhal Production in tonnes 
Maize I 016 762 1.39 
Cotton 217 166 0.90 
Burley tobacco 2 957 1.01 
---
Financial institutions serving the small-scale sector 
The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) is the only financial institute providing 
loans to small holders. In the last three years the following amounts have been 
disbursed to the Small Scale sector to purchase inputs: 
Z$120 million in 1996 
Z$115 million in 1997 
Z$1 06 million in 1998 
Financial services available to the small-scale sector have declined because: 
1. the Government would like parastatals to be self-supporting (which partly 
explains the AFC's proposal to take on commercial banking activities, as 
"Agribank"); 
2. to curb the high default rate in the small holder sector, AFC had to introduce a 
policy of lending only to non-defaulters since 1996, resulting in the decline in 
loans granted; 
3. high interest rates in 1998 have further deterred small-holder borrowers. 
Commercial companies financing the small-holder sector 
The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe is one of the major players in the Cotton Industry. 
Its core business is to buy cotton from producers. It has over 32 depots throughout 
the cotton growing areas, where farmers deliver their produce, and minimise transport 
costs. In order to increase productivity in the small holder sector, the Cotton 
Company has introduced the input credit scheme. Farmers in the small-scale sector 
are required to form groups of 10 members so that they can be supplied with inputs. 
Farmers are required to pay the loans at the end of the season and to market their 
71 
1 412 060 
196 116 
2 992 
cotton through Cotton Company depots. Good performers are promoted to "Gold 
Class" members. Roughly 6,000 farmers in this category borrow cash (rather than 
inputs in-kind)- and it is intended that loans to this group will be taken over by a 
commercial bank, with which the Cotton Company is running a pilot scheme 
currently. 
Cotpro is another ginning company. It has followed the Cotton Company' s lead in 
developing a small-holder input credit scheme. It appears that many farmers prefer to 
sell their produce to buyers who are assisting with inputs. The competition has increased 
- forcing the cotton companies to adopt new approaches or risk losing market share. 
Role of private input companies in the supply of inputs to the small-holder sector 
Major players in the supply of inputs to the small holders in Zimbabwe are as 
follows:-
1. Agricura (Pvt) Ltd. 
2. Windmill (fertiliser and crop chemicals constitute major activity) 
3. ZFC (fertiliser and crop chemical constitute major activity) 
Agricura is the largest crop chemical company in Zimbabwe. Its major activities are 
formulation and distribution of Animal Health products, Home and Garden products, 
and crop chemicals. Products are marketed to all sectors in Zimbabwe and exported 
to other countries in Southern Africa. The box below lists its strengths in input 
supply. 
Input supply company strengths: Agricura's experience 
1. Depots throughout the Country. 
2. Strong Technical Department. 
3. Product distribution network- Retailers/stockists. . 
4. Wide range of chemicals i.e. crop chemicals, Animal Health 
products and Home and Garden. 
5. Group system for the small holder sector - supported by co-
ordinators. 
Reaching the small-holder sector through agencies and community leaders 
There are a number of opportunities for input companies to collaborate with other 
agencies working in the rural sector, to improve outreach. Such agencies include: 
• Agritex and Veterinary Extension Workers 
• Agricultural Finance Corporation 
• Co-operatives 
• NGOs eg World Vision, Christian Care, Citizen Network, Lutheran World 
Federation, and 
• The Cotton Company and Cotpro. 
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Small-holders can also be contacted through community leaders (local chiefs, political 
figures such as councillors, school heads, group chair-person for e.g. AFC loans or 
extension groups, and women's groups). 
Key issues affecting small-holder use of purchased inputs 
1. Education- illiteracy. 
2. Infrastructure not in place -roads, telephones, finance. 
3. Lack of distribution outlets to supply inputs. 
4. Government extension services inadequate. Resources or manpower 
inadequate. 
5. Draught power- not available on time. 
6. Local beliefs or spirit mediums not accepting new technology. 
7. NGO's giving financial assistance to small holders and co-ops without enough 
capacity-buildling. Money is misused, with negligible effect on production. 
8. Financial institutions' recovery methods are poor and defaulters increase. 
Situations and circumstances which facilitate increased use of purchased inputs 
by small-holder farmers 
1. Discussion groups. 
2. Field days and demonstrations covered by local and national papers. 
3. Government and Commercial companies to sponsor training e.g. sending 
farmers to Cotton Research Institute for Pest Scouting Courses. 
4. Recovery of bad debts should be left to financiers and the state should not 
interfere. Repayment rate would improve and more funds would be made 
available. 
5. NGO's should liase with commercial companies on the supply of inputs to 
farmers. Cash should not be given to farmers but in the form of inputs. 
6. Processing of products e.g. ginning, spinning, oil extraction should be done at 
local level to enhance productions, creation of employment and economic 
growth. Cotton buyers in Zimbabwe are improving on this. Prices to 
producers will improve and will increase productivity. 
7. Instructions on the product usage should be written in local languages. 
8. Competitions on the safe use of chemicals should be encouraged at primary 
school level -these are future farmers e.g. Agricultural Chemical Industry 
Association in Zimbabwe have sponsored students at universities. 
9. Group buying, Group responsibility for debts- need for personnel to co-
ordinate activity of Group members. Selection of right people at district level 
is key. 
Strategies to increase the use of purchased inputs 
1. The road network system should be improved in the Communal sector 
especially in areas where there is production. If farmers produce and are able 
to market their products this will motivate them. 
2. Traditional leaders and political leaders should be involved in new ventures. 
3. Women's Groups should be encouraged. Women accept new concepts faster 
than their counterparts. 
4. Minimum tillage should be encouraged where there is draught power shortage 
- encourage use of herbicides. 
5. Tillage units supplied by the state and NGO are reasonably priced on a per 
hectare basis. These should be encouraged and will improve productivity. 
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6. Commercial companies should improve their distribution network, to ensure 
timely availability of the right-priced, right products, in the right pack sizes. 
7. A guarantee facility to be made available to farmers by the state and NGOs for 
the supply of inputs. Commercial companies want security for credits offered. 
NGOs can provide grants to agri-dealers who stock inputs. 
8. Public sector to reduce interest rates to encourage investment. 
In Zimbabwe the standard of living for the smalJ holder farmers has improved. 
Commercial companies have improved on distribution network of agri-inputs. They 
have Technical Sales Representatives who are based at major agricultural centres who 
provide back up services for products marketed. 
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Developing the small-holder market for fertiliser in Uganda 
by John Magnay, Managing Director, Magric (U) Ltd 
Throughout the last twenty years, there have been on-going problems facing the 
commercial sector in their efforts to develop the small-holder market for farm inputs 
in Uganda. Table 1 illustrates the low volumes of inputs currently sold on the 
Ugandan market. (Note that volumes imported into Uganda are higher than those 
indicated because of re-exports to neighbouring countries). 
Table 1: Ugandan market for purchased farm inputs 
hoes 
pang as 
axes 
sickles 
ox ploughs 
tractors/ploughs 
vegetable seed 
field crop seed 
chemicals 
fertiliser 
1.6 million 
250,000 
125,000 
100,000 
1,500 
200 (mostly institutional purchases) 
3 tonnes (95% of seed used is farmer-retained) 
2,500 tonnes (includes NGO purchases) 
na (very small quantities) 
10,000 tonnes 
Whilst purchased inputs are used in relatively low volumes by most small-holders in 
Africa, a comparison with other African countries shows that Ugandan market is 
currently significantly smaller than that in other countries in the region. Table 2 
compares official imports of fertiliser for five countries in Africa. Admittedly some 
of these inputs are used in the plantation sector- but small-holders in these countries 
also find that fertiliser use is essential 
Table 2: Fertiliser imports for selected African countries (1998) 
Uganda 
Kenya 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Malawi 
10,000 tonnes 
150,000 tonnes 
120,000 tonnes 
120,000 tonnes 
50,000 tonnes (1998 imports were low; 80,000 t is more typical) 
Most of Uganda's fertiliser is used in the plantation sector- which is itself relatively 
small. Table 3 gives a breakdown of fertiliser use by sector. In all sectors except 
maize and "other" (i.e. small-holder sectors), demand is growing modestly at about 
10-15% per annum. Whilst the market for maize and "other" crops is currently 
around 2,000 tonnes per year, the potential here is much greater. Demand for 
fertiliser on these crops could easily reach 20,000 tonnes or even 50,000 tonnes-
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given the right conditions. In Rwanda, for instance, where land pressure is much 
greater, farmer numbers are fewer but imports are much higher. In Uganda, many 
farmers still have surplus land, and see its use as a preferred route to increased 
production- rather than intensification. 
Table 3: Fertiliser use by sector, Uganda 
2,500 tonnes 
3, 000 tonnes 
2,000 tonnes 
Sugar 
Tea 
Tobacco 
Coffee 
Rice 
Maize 
Other 
250 tonnes 
250 tonnes 
1 ,200 tonnes 
800 tonnes 
(might be an overestimate) 
Private sector attempts to develop the Ugandan market have been stalled by 
successive projects, which have undermined commercial incentives. Examples 
include: 
• The Agricultural Development Project 
• The Rural Farms Schemes 
• The Coffee Rehabilitation Programme 
• Uganda Hardware Project 
• Relief projects in Uganda and in neighbouring countries 
• flCA-K.R2. 
These projects have distributed free or subsidised inputs which have made the 
establishment of commercial distribution networks, based on world market prices, 
virtually impossible. The Uganda Hardware project destroyed the local market for 
hoes, and one of the other projects imported the most expensive fertiliser ever seen in 
Uganda, but made it available to farmers at prices well below commercial levels. In 
many cases the inputs (even when destined for neighbouring countries) have found 
there way back onto the local market in Uganda, being sold at less than cost price. 
The commercial sector has, or course, connived in this, by taking up project contracts 
to supply such inputs -but this is essentially a strategy to cut its losses within the 
context of an otherwise bleak outlook for market development. 
Short-term projects which supply farm inputs are a major constraint to the 
development of sustainable commercial marketing channels. Such projects are also 
popular politically, which makes it all the more difficult to build consensus around the 
need to limit them. Of course there are other difficulties too. The small-holder sector 
is dispersed - so collaboration with the extension services would be needed to reach 
this target group. The ADC and SG2000 projects provide good examples of how this 
can be achieved. Some might argue that the co-operative movement represents a 
natural partner in this activity- but generally it ill-served the needs of its farming 
constituency, and would almost certainly be stronger today, if that were not the case. 
Viable distribution systems must be trader-driven, and must address the needs of the 
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market. In Zambia, for instance, 70,000 tonnes of fertiliser was distributed to small-
holders, in small packets, through commercial channels. 
To sum up, the limitations on input market development are: 
• sector support projects 
• size of market 
• the relatively high cost of imported goods in Uganda 
• transport costs 
• knowledge amongst farmers 
• relief projects 
• output markets - creates demand for input (output market also unstable) 
Transport costs are particularly problematic- both because of the low volumes (hence 
high per unit cost) of imports, and because of high costs between Kampala and rural 
stockists (which may add 50-60% to the Kampala price). The development of the 
mobile phone network will undoubtedly contribute to improved information on prices 
and at least reduce the speculative element in pricing which exploits the poor 
information flow. 
There is evidence of growing awareness in Uganda of the importance to develop 
sustainable commercial input distribution networks. The commercial sector is 
certainly prepared to take risks, and make investments, providing the commitment to 
commercial distribution is there amongst policy-makers and politicians too. Two 
years without a major input supply project would be sufficient to make inroads on the 
establishment of commercial networks to supply inputs to small-holders. 
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